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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Daniel B. Dorn, in his capacity as the Parent and Natural 
guardian of E.D., R.D., and Y.D., Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
Paul S. Cohen and Susan Cohen, Individually and in their 
capacity as the Co-Conservators of the person of Abbie 
Ilene Dorn, a protected person and ward, and in their 
capacity as Co-Trustees of the Abbie Dorn Special Needs 
Trust, Respondents. 
 
Paul S. Cohen, M.D. and Susan Cohen, Respondents, 
 
v. 

 
E.D., R.D., and Y.D., The Living Issue of Abbie Ilene 

Dorn, and the South Carolina Department of Health and 
Human Services, Respondents below, 
 
Of whom E.D., R.D., and Y.D., The Living Issue of 
Abbie Ilene Dorn are the Appellants, 
 
and 
 
the South Carolina Department of Health and Human 
Services is a Respondent. 
 
In Re: The Abbie Dorn Special Needs Trust 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000659 
Appeal From Horry County 

Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge 

14 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion No. 5432 

Heard May 11, 2016 – Filed August 3, 2016 

AFFIRMED 
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Daniel B. Dorn, E.D., R.D., and Y.D. 
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of Charleston, for Appellant Daniel B. Dorn.
John Kachmarsky, of Law Office of John Kachmarsky, 
of Charleston, as Court Appointed Attorney and 
Guardian ad Litem for Appellants E.D., R.D., and Y.D. 
Reese Rodman Boyd, III and Bret Harlan Davis, of Davis 
& Boyd, LLC, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondents Paul S. 
Cohen and Susan Cohen. 
Lynette Rogers Hedgepath, of the Hedgepath Law Firm,
PA, of Conway, as Court Appointed Attorney for Abbie 
Ilene Dorn. 
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Firm, PA, of Surfside Beach, as Court Appointed 
Guardian ad Litem for Abbie Ilene Dorn. 
Shealy Boland Reibold, of the South Carolina 
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for Respondent South Carolina Department of Health and 
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KONDUROS, J.:  Daniel Bernard Dorn and E.D., R.D., and Y.D. (collectively, 
Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order dismissing as not immediately 
appealable their appeal of the probate court's order adding a party after the 
conclusion of Dorn's case-in-chief.  Appellants contend the probate court's order, 
which added Abbie Ilene Dorn (Abbie) as a party to Dorn's petition to remove 
Abbie's parents, Paul S. Cohen, M.D. and Susan Cohen (collectively, the Cohens), 
as the coconservators and cotrustees of the Abbie Dorn Special Needs Trust (the 
Trust), was immediately appealable because it affected Dorn's substantial right to 
name his own defendant and to control the presentation of evidence at trial.  We 
affirm the circuit court's order. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Dorn and Abbie began trying to conceive a child after marrying in 2002.  Despite 
difficulty, Abbie conceived triplets and delivered E.D., R.D., and Y.D. 
(collectively, Children) at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Cedars-Sinai) in Los 
Angeles, California on June 21, 2006.  During delivery, Abbie suffered 
catastrophic injuries that left her incapacitated. 
Abbie, through Dorn and her guardian ad litem, brought and settled a medical 
malpractice claim against Cedars-Sinai for $6,730,000.  The settlement funded the 
Trust through a one-time contribution of $910,275.20.  The balance of the 
settlement funded the purchase of a $4,333,105 annuity, which was to provide 
periodic payments of $31,000 per month to the Trust over the remainder of Abbie's 
life. The amount of the annuity payments to the Trust was set to increase annually 
at a rate of 3.5%. 
The Trust named Abbie as its sole primary beneficiary and Children as remainder 
beneficiaries after Abbie's death.1  The Trust named the Cohens as cotrustees. 2 
1  Children's interest as remainder beneficiaries of the Trust was subject to the 
Trust's repayment of the South Carolina Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) for expenditures made by South Carolina on Abbie's behalf. 
2  The Trust was established to provide a discretionary, spendthrift trust to 
supplement public resources and benefits, at the Cohens' discretion, when public 
resources and benefits were unavailable or insufficient to provide for Abbie's
health, safety, and welfare. 
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The Trust empowered the Cohens to employ professionals, including attorneys, for 
estate administration purposes and to represent Abbie in legal matters.  The Trust 
made compensation of the attorneys hired on Abbie's behalf contingent on court 
approval. 
The Cohens moved to California to care for Abbie so she could remain close to 
Children; however, after learning Abbie was unlikely to secure daily visitation 
with Children, the Cohens returned with Abbie to their home in Horry County.  On
April 1, 2008, the Horry County Probate Court transferred jurisdiction over the 
Trust from Kern County, California to Horry County. 
Dorn informed the Cohens he wanted a divorce, and they brought a marital 
dissolution action on Abbie's behalf in California in 2008.  The California family 
court bifurcated the action and entered an order dissolving Dorn and Abbie's 
marriage on September 11, 2008.  The California family court decided the custody, 
visitation, and child support portions of Dorn and Abbie's divorce nearly three 
years later in April 2011.
In November 2010, Dorn filed an emergency petition on Children's behalf to 
remove the Cohens as the Trust's cotrustees and sought a temporary restraining 
order (TRO) to prevent the Cohens from spending Trust money on anything other 
than Abbie's medical needs. Dorn alleged the Cohens abused their fiduciary 
responsibilities, violated the Trust's terms, and spent a substantial portion of the 
Trust's corpus on litigating the visitation portion of Dorn and Abbie's divorce.  
Dorn also sought repayment of all Trust funds associated with litigating the 
California visitation action. 
Two days later, the Cohens filed a petition to affirm $495,326.75 in legal fees paid 
by the Trust and to reform the Trust's terms.  The Cohens alleged the Trust's terms 
created a logistical impracticability by requiring them to obtain court approval 
before paying attorney's fees. The Cohens maintained the Trust empowered them
to incur and pay legal fees on Abbie's behalf; further, the Cohens sought 
permission to pay future legal fees with Trust funds.
The probate court held a TRO hearing on December 15, 2010, and denied Dorn's
request for a TRO. The probate court believed there was some question as to 
17 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
whether the Cohens were authorized to pay legal fees with Trust funds and thought
Dorn's and the Cohens' petitions should be heard together in a single trial.  Dorn 
stated he had no objection to the cases being heard together, and he believed the 
questions of fact were common to both petitions. 
The probate court found Dorn should be served with the Cohens' petition and it 
should be amended to name both Children and DHHS as parties.  The probate 
court recognized a potential conflict of interest existed if Dorn were to represent 
Children with respect to the Cohens' petition because of the ongoing visitation 
dispute between Dorn and the Cohens.  To resolve any conflict of interest, the 
probate court announced it would appoint a guardian ad litem to independently 
represent Children. The probate court appointed John Kachmarsky (Children's 
GAL) as attorney and guardian ad litem for Children on February 21, 2011.  
Contemporaneously, the probate court appointed Virginia Lee Moore as guardian 
ad litem (Abbie's GAL) and Lynette Rodgers Hedgepath (Appointed Attorney) as 
the appointed attorney for Abbie. 
The Cohens amended their petition and named DHHS and Children as parties.  
Abbie and Children filed separate answers to the amended petition.  Children 
asserted a counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty against the Cohens, alleging 
the Cohens failed to exercise prudence or discretion in their pursuit of visitation 
with Children and dissipated the Trust's corpus without court approval.  The 
Cohens answered Children's counterclaim and denied breaching their duties as 
cotrustees; further, the Cohens maintained Children failed to state a claim on which 
relief could be granted. 
Trial commenced before the probate court on February 25, 2013. Dorn sought 
clarification regarding whether the probate court intended to hear three separate 
claims in a single trial, including Dorn's petition, the Cohens' petition, and 
Children's counterclaim.  The Cohens believed trying multiple cases
simultaneously was impractical and suggested Dorn's petition be heard and 
rebutted first, followed by the Cohens' petition.  The Cohens argued any 
duplicative testimony from the first trial could be incorporated into the second trial 
as needed.  Children preferred the petitions be heard simultaneously.  Neither 
Abbie's GAL nor Appointed Attorney expressed a preference as to how the case 
should proceed. 
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The probate court believed the petitions were intertwined and trying the petitions 
together would be most effective.  The probate court indicated if the petitions were 
heard separately, it was extremely unlikely the probate court would issue a 
decision at the end of the trial on Dorn's petition.  The probate court explained 
Dorn would present his case first and the Cohens, Children, Appointed Attorney, 
and Abbie's GAL would be given an opportunity to cross-examine Dorn's 
witnesses. The probate court provided the parties would need to take that 
opportunity to question witnesses with respect to their own cases.  The probate 
court stated the parties could recall witnesses later and call rebuttal witnesses to 
Dorn's case when presenting their own cases. 
Appointed Attorney requested Dorn provide the parties with the order in which 
Dorn intended to call his witnesses.  Dorn explained he would do whatever the 
probate court asked of him but noted the Cohens, Appointed Attorney, and Abbie's 
GAL had not requested Dorn's witness list during discovery.  Dorn believed asking 
him to provide a witness list at that point circumvented the discovery process and 
sought information he was not required to provide.  The probate court required 
only that Dorn inform the parties of the witnesses he intended to call before each 
day of trial. Finally, the probate court clarified Appointed Attorney was appointed 
to represent Abbie and not to represent Abbie's GAL. 
Dorn, the Cohens, Children, and Appointed Attorney all presented opening 
statements. Dorn objected during Appointed Attorney's opening statement to 
statements regarding the potential repayment of legal fees to the Trust.  The 
probate court told Dorn it would consider his objections to Appointed Attorney's
anticipated evidence when Appointed Attorney presented that evidence during 
trial. Dorn called six witnesses in support of his petition.  Appointed Attorney and 
Abbie's GAL cross-examined five and six of Dorn's witnesses, respectively. 
On the last day of trial, Dorn sought to clarify Abbie's status regarding the two 
petitions before the probate court.  Dorn acknowledged the probate court appointed 
Abbie's GAL and Appointed Attorney but maintained Abbie was not a named 
party to his petition. The probate court interjected: 
She may not be named as a party, but let's be clear, in my 
opinion, she is a party in your action to remove the 
trustees of her trust. I didn't go back to look at the order, 
and I'm happy to, but my position is I appointed 
[Appointed Attorney] and [Abbie's GAL] to represent 
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Abbie in the action you brought and in the action the 
Cohens brought. 
Dorn argued Abbie was not a party because she was not listed on the pleadings.  
Dorn acknowledged Appointed Attorney and Abbie's GAL could cross-examine 
witnesses but argued they could not call their own witnesses during trial on Dorn's 
petition. The probate court responded Abbie was an indispensable party and if 
Dorn took the position Abbie was not a party earlier in the proceedings, it would 
have directed him to amend his pleadings.  Dorn maintained he was unaware of 
any point in the proceedings when the probate court announced Abbie was a party 
to the petitions. Dorn contended Abbie was not a true party.  Dorn argued Abbie 
did not answer the pleadings, serve or accept service of discovery, or file a petition 
seeking to be named a party to the petitions.  Dorn argued he was never advised he 
needed to serve Abbie and Abbie never requested service.  Children agreed with 
Dorn and argued Abbie was not a named party, whereas Children and DHHS were. 
The Cohens argued Dorn's objections to Abbie's party status were untimely.  They 
averred the probate court specifically stated all parties would be given an 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses but whether Appointed Attorney and 
Abbie's GAL would not be allowed to call their own witnesses was not discussed.  
Abbie's GAL argued guardians ad litem in family court routinely called their own 
witnesses. Abbie's GAL also contended Abbie was a necessary party and Abbie's 
GAL and Appointed Attorney should be able to present any witnesses deemed 
necessary to protect Abbie's interests.  Dorn argued his objection to Abbie's party 
status was not waived because he was not required to raise it until Abbie acted as a 
party, which had not occurred until that point in the case. 
Appointed Attorney argued she and Abbie's GAL actively participated in the 
proceedings after they were appointed to represent Abbie on both petitions.  
Appointed Attorney argued she and Abbie's GAL attended depositions, 
participated in motions hearings and trials, and presented the probate court with fee 
affidavits. Appointed Attorney acknowledged she did not answer Dorn's petition 
but stated she would have answered if Abbie had been served.  Appointed Attorney 
argued Dorn was on notice of Abbie's party status at the time the probate court 
appointed Appointed Attorney and Abbie's GAL.  Appointed Attorney contended it
was incumbent on Dorn to formally serve Abbie at that time. 
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Dorn argued Appointed Attorney and Abbie's GAL's involvement in the case 
rendered Abbie a participant, not a party.  Dorn believed Abbie, as a participant, 
could cross-examine witnesses and submit fee petitions; however, Dorn argued a 
distinction arose because Abbie could not be served with discovery or call 
witnesses. 
The probate court denied Dorn's motion to exclude Appointed Attorney and 
Abbie's GAL from calling witnesses based on Dorn's argument that Abbie was not 
a party. The probate court reiterated Dorn's underlying petition sought to remove 
the trustees of Abbie's trust, which made her an interested party.  The probate court 
stated it must consider Abbie's best interests and was unaware of any rule 
preventing a court appointed guardian ad litem from calling his or her own 
witnesses in an action involving a protected person. 
The parties did not complete the trial within the time allotted by the probate court.  
At the conclusion of the time scheduled for trial, the probate court requested 
Appointed Attorney and Abbie's GAL provide it with a list of potential witnesses.  
The probate court also requested the parties submit briefs on any outstanding 
motions, including adding Abbie as a party. 
The parties submitted briefs at the end of March.  In her brief, Abbie requested an 
amendment to the pleadings to allow her to present evidence and testimony 
regarding the Cohens' reliance on experts in performing their fiduciary duties.  
Abbie argued Dorn had ample opportunity to conduct discovery and would suffer 
no prejudice by amending the pleadings.  The Cohens argued they should be 
allowed to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence they presented at trial 
to assert the defense of advice of counsel.  The Cohens argued Dorn had the 
opportunity to refute any evidence presented showing the Cohens relied on 
counsel's advice.  Dorn argued it would be unduly prejudicial to allow the Cohens 
and Abbie to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence and allow the 
Cohens to assert an affirmative defense two weeks into trial because Dorn would 
be required to submit additional discovery, conduct further depositions, and 
potentially recall every witness who previously testified. 
The probate court held a telephone status conference with the parties on November 
25, 2013. Thereafter, on December 3, 2013, the probate court issued an order 
continuing the incomplete trial and another order adding Abbie as a party to both 
petitions pursuant to Rule 19, SCRCP. 
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Appellants appealed to the circuit court the probate court's order adding Abbie as a 
party. On March 10, 2014, the probate court issued an order granting Abbie and 
the Cohens' motions to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence and found 
Dorn would not suffer any prejudice and would be afforded a full opportunity to 
address the issues raised in the amended pleadings. 
On June 26, 2014, the Cohens moved before the probate court for a mistrial on the 
basis the probate court judge who heard the first part of the trial on Dorn's and the 
Cohens' petitions was not reelected and would not likely be able to resume the 
proceedings before leaving office.  The probate court judge recused herself from 
the matter on September 3, 2014.  On October 14, 2014, the Cohens moved to stay 
the appeals filed by Appellants until a new judge was appointed and the 
proceedings were tried to conclusion or until a mistrial was declared. 
The circuit court held a hearing on the Cohens' motion to stay on February 9, 2015.  
At the hearing, the circuit court stated it was unlikely a mistrial would be granted.  
The circuit court found Appellants' appeals were not immediately appealable 
because no final decision had been rendered in the case.  The circuit court 
dismissed the appeals as not immediately appealable and did not rule on the 
Cohens' motion to stay the appeal at that time.3  This appeal followed. 
3 The Form 4 orders contained in the record appear to state that the circuit court 
had already ruled Appellants' appeals were not immediately appealable and 
because of that the circuit court found the Cohens' motion for a stay moot.  
Specifically, the orders stated, 
This case came before the Court during the February 9, 
2015 common pleas non-jury term for a hearing on 
Defendant Paul S. Cohen's Motion to Stay, filed October 
15, 2014. Because this Court denied Plaintiff Daniel B. 
Dorn's [p]robate [a]ppeal, filed December 23, 2013 as 
interlocutory, Defendant Paul S. Cohen's Motion to Stay, 
filed October 15, 2014 is resolved as moot. 
The Form 4 orders were sufficient for this court to consider whether the probate 
court's order was immediately appealable.  See Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., 
Parole, & Pardon Servs., 372 S.C. 279, 284, 641 S.E.2d 895, 897 (2007) ("As both 
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LAW/ANALYSIS 
Appellants argue the probate court's order adding Abbie as a party to Dorn's 
petition to remove the Cohens as cotrustees of the Trust is immediately appealable 
because it affects Dorn's substantial right to name his own defendants and control 
the presentation of evidence at trial.  Appellants contend the probate court's order 
affected Dorn's substantial right because he could have received complete relief 
without Abbie's addition as a party.  Appellants also argue allowing Appointed 
Attorney and Abbie's GAL to call undisclosed witnesses for whom Dorn had not 
prepared prevented Dorn from being able to identify, depose, or receive discovery 
from those witnesses, which left Dorn unable to effectively litigate the case, 
needlessly delayed proceedings, and burdened the Trust with extra costs.  We 
disagree. 
"The determination of whether a trial court's order is immediately appealable is 
governed by statute."  Morrow v. Fundamental Long-Term Care Holdings, LLC, 
412 S.C. 534, 537, 773 S.E.2d 144, 145 (2015).  Section 14-3-330 of the South 
Carolina Code (1977 & Supp. 2015) states, 
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction for 
correction of errors of law in law cases, and shall review 
upon appeal: 
(1) Any intermediate judgment, order or decree in a 
law case involving the merits in actions commenced in 
the court of common pleas and general sessions, brought 
there by original process or removed there from any 
inferior court or jurisdiction, and final judgments in such 
actions; provided, that if no appeal be taken until final 
judgment is entered the court may upon appeal from such 
final judgment review any intermediate order or decree 
necessarily affecting the judgment not before appealed 
from;
court rule and this Court's precedent provide, a judgment is effective only when 
reduced to writing and entered into the record."). 
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 (2) An order affecting a substantial right made in an 
action when such order (a) in effect determines the action 
and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be 
taken or discontinues the action, (b) grants or refuses a 
new trial or (c) strikes out an answer or any part thereof 
or any pleading in any action; 
 
(3) A final order affecting a substantial right made in 
any special proceeding or upon a summary application in 
any action after judgment; and 
 
(4) An interlocutory order or decree in a court of 
common pleas granting, continuing, modifying, or 
refusing an injunction or granting, continuing, modifying, 
or refusing the appointment of a receiver. 
 
Our supreme court has held an order depriving a plaintiff of his or her ability to 
determine the defendant against whom he or she brings a cause of action can affect 
a substantial right, making the order immediately appealable.  See Morrow, 412 
S.C. at 539, 773 S.E.2d at 146 ("The effect of this order is to prevent the 
[plaintiffs] from being architects of their own complaint, and deprives them of 
bringing their case against the defendant of their own choosing."); Neeltec Enters., 
Inc. v. Long, 397 S.C. 563, 566, 725 S.E.2d 926, 928 (2012) ("The right of the 
plaintiff to choose [his] defendant is a substantial right within the meaning of this 
subsection."). 
 
However, the fact that the probate court's order, on its face, added Abbie as a party 
to Dorn's petition is not inherently dispositive of whether the probate court's order 
was immediately appealable.  Rather, "the question of whether an order is 
immediately appealable is determined on a case-by-case basis."  See Morrow, 412 
S.C. at 538, 773 S.E.2d at 146. To determine whether an order is immediately 
appealable, we look to the probate court's order's effect on the proceedings.  See 
Thornton v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Corp., 391 S.C. 297, 304, 705 S.E.2d 475, 479 (Ct. 
App. 2011) ("[A]n appellate court should look to the effect of an interlocutory 
order to determine its appealability under section 14-3-330(2)(c)."). 
 
In Neeltec, our supreme court held an order requiring a plaintiff to substitute two 
corporations as defendants in lieu of the individual the plaintiff originally named in 
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the complaint was immediately appealable.  397 S.C. at 564, 725 S.E.2d at 927.  In 
that case, the plaintiff originally filed an action against Willard Long, in his 
individual capacity, for blocking the plaintiff's advertisements for a fireworks store 
off Interstate 95 with advertisements for Long's own store, Fireworks Superstore.  
Id. at 565, 725 S.E.2d at 927. In defending the action, Long filed a "Motion for 
Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Substitution of Parties," alleging 
Long did not own Fireworks Superstore but that it was owned by Hobo Joes, Inc. 
and subsequently, by Foxy's Fireworks Superstore, Inc.  Id. at 565, 725 S.E.2d at 
927-28. The special referee granted Long's motion, finding Long was not the 
proper defendant and ordered the plaintiff to substitute the two corporations as 
defendants. Id.  In finding the order immediately appealable, our supreme court 
stated the order "effectively discontinue[d] [the plaintiff's] suit against Long, thus 
bringing the order under 2(a)."  Id. at 566, 725 S.E.2d at 928. 
Similarly, in Morrow, our supreme court held an order bifurcating proceedings that 
had the effect of depriving the plaintiffs of their substantial right to bring a case 
against the defendant of their choosing was immediately appealable.  412 S.C. at 
539, 773 S.E.2d at 146. In that case, the plaintiffs filed a negligence action against 
a nursing home for injuries sustained by a resident who was assisted in the shower 
by a nursing home employee.  Id. at 535-36, 773 S.E.2d at 144-45.  In addition, the 
plaintiffs filed suit against the nursing home's corporate parents, alleging they were 
vicariously liable for the nursing home's negligence and directly liable for 
underfunding the nursing home, which led to staffing and training deficiencies.  Id. 
at 536, 773 S.E.2d at 145. The nursing home's corporate parents filed a motion to 
bifurcate the trial, arguing the issues of the nursing home's negligence and 
corporate negligence were distinct.  Id.  Thereafter, the trial court issued an order 
stating the action against the nursing home could go forward but only if the 
plaintiffs were successful would the second action on corporate negligence proceed 
before a jury at trial.  Id.  In finding the circuit court's order immediately 
appealable, our supreme court stated the effect of the trial court's order was to grant 
the nursing home's corporate parents potential summary judgment on the issue of 
direct corporate liability because the plaintiffs would not be able to litigate that 
claim against the corporate parents if they were unsuccessful in their direct action 
against the nursing home. Id. at 539, 773 S.E.2d at 146.  Our supreme court 
further determined the effect of the circuit court's order "deprive[d] [the plaintiffs] 
of bringing their case against the defendant of their own choosing."  Id.
25 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We find the probate court's order in this case did not affect Dorn's substantial right 
to choose his own defendant.  Unlike the orders in Neeltec and Morrow, the 
probate court's order in this case neither substituted Abbie for the Cohens nor 
deprived Dorn of the ability to maintain his petition to remove the Cohens as the 
Trust's cotrustees.  Rather, the probate court's order had the effect of an order 
granting a motion to intervene because it allowed for Abbie's full participation as a 
party in the action seeking to remove the trustees of the trust created for her 
benefit. See Duncan v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 331 S.C. 484, 485, 449 S.E.2d 580, 
580 (1994) (holding an appeal from an order of the circuit court granting a 
guardian ad litem's motion to intervene was interlocutory, did not affect a 
substantial right, and was therefore not immediately appealable). 
Appellants' contention that Dorn could have received complete relief without 
Abbie's addition as a party in unavailing.  Appellants' argument overlooks Abbie's 
interest as the primary beneficiary of the Trust.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-
103(2)(A) (Supp. 2015) (stating a beneficiary is "a person [who] . . .  has a present 
or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent").  "[A]ccording to the 
former decisions of this court, it is indispensable that the beneficiaries be made 
parties to any proceeding brought for the purpose of adjudicating their interest."  
Hood v. Cannon, 178 S.C. 94, 99-100, 182 S.E.2d 306, 308 (1935).  In this case, 
determination of the issues before the probate court had serious consequences for 
Abbie, whose welfare and care depended directly on the prudent use of the Trust's
funds. Therefore, the probate court's joinder of Abbie under Rule 19, SCRCP, was 
proper and enabled Abbie, through Appointed Attorney and Abbie's GAL, to 
protect her interests as the Trust's primary beneficiary.  See Rule 19(a), SCRCP 
("A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive 
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a 
party in the action if . . . he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action 
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may . . . as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest . . . ." (emphasis 
added)). 
To the extent Appellants argue Abbie's interests were adequately represented by 
the Cohens, we disagree. This argument fails to recognize the distinction between 
guardians and guardians ad litem, as well as the position in which Dorn's petition 
placed the Cohens by forcing them to defend their expenditures from the Trust.  
"The terms 'guardian' and 'guardian ad litem' have separate and distinct legal 
meanings; thus, persons appointed to serve in those capacities are charged with 
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separate and distinct duties and obligations."  Wilson v. Ball, 337 S.C. 493, 496, 
523 S.E.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1999). 
A "guardian" is one given the power and charged with 
the duty of taking care of a person who is considered 
incapable of administering his or her own affairs and of 
managing his or her property rights.  A "guardian ad 
litem," on the other hand, is one authorized to prosecute 
on behalf of or defend an incapacitated person in any suit 
to which the incapacitated person may be a party and to 
protect his or her interests in the particular litigation. 
Id. at 496-97, 523 S.E.2d at 806 (footnote omitted).  Further, "[a] guardian ad litem
is a representative of the court[,] appointed to assist it in properly protecting the 
interests of an incompetent person." Shainwald v. Shainwald, 302 S.C. 453, 457, 
395 S.E.2d 441, 444 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The record makes abundantly clear the Cohens are excellent caregivers and 
provide Abbie with outstanding care.  However, given that Dorn's petition places 
the Cohens in the unenviable position of defending their expenditures from the 
Trust, a potential conflict of interest exists between whether Trust funds were used 
to satisfy Abbie's special needs versus the Cohens' perception of Abbie's needs.  
Thus, while Appellants are correct the Cohens are Abbie's guardians and can 
protect her interests under many circumstances, the independent representation the 
probate court afforded Abbie by appointing Abbie's GAL and Appointed Attorney 
was needed here. 
Further, despite Appellants' arguments to the contrary, Dorn suffered no undue 
prejudice as a result of the probate court's order adding Abbie as a party to the 
proceedings. Appellants argue the probate court's order left Dorn unable to 
effectively litigate his case; however, the record gives no indication Dorn would 
not be given sufficient time to prepare to cross-examine any witnesses Appointed 
Attorney and Abbie's GAL may call to testify at trial.  The probate court indicated 
from the outset that because both petitions were based on the same questions of 
fact, it would be flexible with the parties' presentation of their cases and allow the 
parties to recall witnesses and call rebuttal witnesses if necessary.  Appellants 
never objected to this procedural arrangement; instead, both Dorn and Children 
were early proponents of trying the petitions simultaneously.
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The record demonstrates Abbie, through Appointed Attorney and Abbie's GAL, 
fully participated in the proceedings through depositions, presented an opening 
statement, and participated in cross-examination of the other parties' witnesses 
before she was officially named a party to the petitions.  The probate court's 
comments demonstrated it intended to allow Appointed Attorney and Abbie's GAL 
to fully participate at trial.  Further, Appointed Attorney's willingness to answer 
Dorn's petition if Abbie had been served with Dorn's petition demonstrated a 
common understanding amongst the parties Abbie was to be afforded the rights of 
a full party to both petitions from the beginning of trial.  Therefore, we find 
Appellants were not unduly prejudiced by Abbie's addition as a party in this case 
and the circuit court properly determined the probate court's order was not 
immediately appealable because Abbie's addition as a party did not affect Dorn's 
substantial right to choose his own defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
We find the circuit court did not err in dismissing as not immediately appealable 
Appellants' appeals of the probate court's order adding Abbie as a party.  
Consequently, the circuit court's order is 
AFFIRMED. 
HUFF and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 
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MCDONALD, J.: In this case arising from an extensive roof fire, a jury awarded 
the Winthrop University Trustees for the State of South Carolina (Winthrop) 
$7,223,343.14 in damages against Pickens Roofing and Sheet Metals, Inc. 
(Pickens). On appeal, Pickens argues the circuit court erred in (1) denying its 
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motion for a new trial absolute based on the court's refusal to strike a juror for 
cause; (2) denying its directed verdict motion as to liability; (3) failing to properly 
recharge the jury on proximate cause; (4) bifurcating the liability and damages 
phases of trial; (5) denying its directed verdict motion as to damages; and (6) 
failing to adjust the jury's damages verdict to reflect Winthrop's comparative 
negligence. We affirm. 
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 6, 2009, a fire erupted on the roofs of Bancroft Hall and Owens Hall, 
two buildings on the campus of Winthrop University.  Bancroft Hall, a U-shaped 
building, was originally constructed in 1909; Winthrop built Owens Hall adjacent 
to Bancroft Hall in 2007.  Connecting Bancroft Hall and Owens Hall is a flat roof 
(the flat roof), which is situated lower than the pitched roofs of the two adjoining 
buildings.1 
In 2009, Winthrop sought bids for the Bancroft Hall reroofing project, which 
involved removing asbestos-containing shingles and updating the roof's appearance 
to be consistent with that of newly constructed Owens Hall.  Winthrop hired 
Stafford Consulting Engineers (Stafford) to design and prepare specifications for 
the project. After Winthrop awarded the construction bid to Pickens, Stafford 
prepared a construction contract, incorporating the specifications into the contract 
terms.  One specification required Pickens to maintain worksite safety precautions 
and "[c]omply with all applicable laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and orders of 
any public body having jurisdiction for the safety of persons or property or to 
protect them from damage, injury or loss."2  Additionally, the following 
specification applied to storage areas for work materials:  "Prior to starting work, 
obtain approval from Owner [Winthrop] for locations of work operations at ground 
level, such as material storage, hoisting, dumping, etc.  Restrict work to approved 
1 The flat roof measures approximately twenty to twenty-five feet long by twelve 
feet wide on one side and three to four feet wide on the other side.  
2 The International Fire Code, which includes standards of the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA), is incorporated by reference in South Carolina 
municipal and county building codes.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-9-50(A) (Supp. 
2015). Of importance in this appeal, section 8.3.3 of NFPA 241 prohibits the "yard 
storage" of combustible materials within thirty feet of a structure during 
construction.  
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locations." Pursuant to the agreement, Winthrop approved storage of materials in 
(1) a "lay down" area on the ground in front of Bancroft Hall and (2) a nearby 
parking lot.   
During the week of March 1–5, 2009, a three-man Pickens metal crew installed 
copper on the dormer windows of the Bancroft Hall roof.  No other construction 
crews worked on Bancroft Hall or Owens Hall that week.  The Pickens crew stored 
some roofing materials on the flat roof and did not remove them when they 
finished work around 4:00 p.m. on Friday, March 5.  The following afternoon, a 
student noticed smoke emerging from the Owens Hall roof; campus police and the 
fire department responded to the scene.  The fire burned for over twenty-four hours 
into the early evening of March 7.  Despite using a stream of approximately 300 
gallons of water per minute, the fire department had difficulty extinguishing the 
fire within the insulation layer of the Owens Hall roof.
On August 31, 2012, Winthrop filed a complaint against Pickens for (1) breach of 
contract, (2) breach of implied warranty of workmanship, and (3) negligence.  
Winthrop alleged that Pickens's storage of combustible construction materials on 
the flat roof—negligently and in violation of the contract terms—caused its fire-
related damages. The case was tried by jury from March 17–21, 2014.  
Before trial, the circuit court conducted voir dire of the potential jurors.  During the 
jury selection process, the circuit court asked if any jurors or their family members 
had worked for or had a business relationship with Winthrop.  Juror 25 stated, "I 
am a student researcher at Winthrop and I do know about this. . . .  I was there 
during the fire, the incident, so I know people who were affected by it."  When 
asked if she could remain impartial despite her experience and relationships, Juror 
25 responded, "I could do that.  I could do that.  That's not a problem.  It's just I 
wanted to say that I knew things that occurred."  When asked what specific 
knowledge she had, Juror 25 responded, "The fire, the incident, things that were 
said about how it occurred, and so forth."  Juror 25 asserted that she could be 
impartial despite her knowledge of the fire.   
The circuit court also asked if any jurors or their family members were Winthrop 
graduates. Juror 25 stated she was a "recent graduate" but could remain impartial.  
Additionally, the circuit court asked if any member of the jury pool had heard 
about the case through media coverage.  Juror 25 again responded, noting, "I 
watched it on the news.  I am friends with students who were affected by the fire.  
They discussed some things that they knew and the school website and then some 
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[of] the professors talked about it, but I don't live on campus so I don't know any 
specifics, but I have watched it."  The circuit court then stated: 
This is very important. . . .  Could you put aside anything 
you may have heard about the case before coming here to 
court today or anything about it that happened, and 
render your decision solely on the sworn testimony and 
evidence that comes in during the trial and the court's 
instruction on the law that applies and [render] a decision 
which is fair and impartial to both sides based solely on 
that evidence that applies.  Could you do that or not do 
that? 
Juror 25 responded affirmatively.  
The court selected a twenty-person strike panel, which included Juror 25.  During a 
recess before the parties exercised their peremptory strikes, Pickens apparently 
requested in chambers to strike Juror 25 for cause.  Subsequently, Pickens 
exercised a peremptory strike on Juror 25.  After the jury was sworn, Pickens 
placed its motion to strike Juror 25 for cause on the record, arguing the circuit 
court should strike Juror 25 because she "is a student at Winthrop University" who 
indicated she had watched the fire on the news and discussed it with students and 
faculty. Pickens argued, "I felt that that gave her a perspective on this case that 
other jurors would not have." 
The circuit court denied Pickens's motion, finding that even though Juror 25 was a 
Winthrop graduate, she did not know any more specifics about the case than other 
jurors who knew about it had learned through news coverage.  The circuit court 
also emphasized that Juror 25 responded affirmatively that she could be impartial 
when asked if she could put aside any prior knowledge and decide the case based 
on the evidence presented at trial.  The circuit court noted that this decision 
differed from its decision to strike another juror who had a connection as a current 
employee, stating, "You demonstrated no cause to strike her solely [based] on 
whatever connection she might have known about the case before. . . .  In any 
event, you struck her. You are not prejudiced by that.  She is not on the jury 
obviously."  
Before trial, Winthrop filed a motion in limine requesting bifurcation of the trial 
into liability and damages phases pursuant to Rule 42(b), SCRCP.  Winthrop 
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asserted the damages testimony could add several days to the trial and argued there 
were no genuine issues as to the extent of its damages.  Pickens opposed the 
motion for bifurcation, and the parties discussed bifurcation in chambers.  Pickens 
did not put its arguments in opposition to bifurcation on the record, but stated, "I 
understand that we had a conversation in chambers with Your Honor.  Your 
Honor[] has reached a decision on that.  I just wanted to state that we did oppose 
that for the record." 
The circuit court granted the motion to bifurcate, explaining, "I questioned 
[Winthrop] very closely about that because I was not inclined to bifurcate if . . . the 
same witnesses [would] testify in the second trial with regard to damages . . . ."  
Determining most of the damages witnesses would not be called to testify during 
the liability phase, the circuit court reasoned, 
It makes sense to me to bifurcate because if the jury were 
to return a verdict for [Pickens] we wouldn't have to 
spend all that time with all those witnesses on damages.  
On the other hand, if they return a verdict against 
[Pickens] then with regard to damages the witnesses 
pretty much are different witnesses. . . .  So we won't lose 
any time or have to put witnesses up to testify basically 
to the same things twice. 
During the liability phase of trial, Otis Driggers, a certified fire investigator, was 
qualified as an expert in the field of fire investigation and cause and origin 
investigation. He testified he could not locate the source of ignition during his 
investigation, but determined that the fire originated on the flat roof.  The parties 
also stipulated that the fire originated on the flat roof.  In his investigation, 
Driggers interviewed Randall Pruitt (Randall), Matthew Pruitt (Matthew), and 
Brandon Lusk (Lusk), three Pickens employees who worked on the Bancroft Hall 
roof project the week before the fire.  According to Driggers, the crew reported 
leaving materials such as rolls of felt paper, metal louvers, and copper flashing on 
the flat roof when they left work at 4:00 p.m. on Friday, March 5.  
Randall, the sheet metal foreman for the project, supervised Matthew and Lusk.  
Randall worked under his boss, Bobby Pickens (Bobby), and the project manager, 
Clint Robinson (Robinson). Randall, Matthew, and Lusk used the flat roof for 
breaks and for storing materials; Lusk and Matthew recalled going back and forth 
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to the flat roof several times on March 5 to get materials for installing copper on 
the dormers.  Randall testified he only stored copper flashing and other metal 
materials on the flat roof, and he recalled transporting roofing paper to his truck 
when he left work.  However, in a deposition and interview with Driggers, Randall 
acknowledged that he left rolls of roofing paper on the flat roof.  Lusk recalled 
storing copper panels, louvers, metal screws, and metal clips on the flat roof, but 
denied storing felt paper or wooden pallets on the flat roof.  When Winthrop 
impeached Lusk with his post-fire interview with Driggers in which he stated they 
stored felt paper on the flat roof, Lusk asserted Driggers misunderstood him about 
paper storage. Matthew testified they stored shingles, copper, metal pieces, and 
felt paper on the flat roof. All three Pickens metal workers testified they did not 
smoke or use any soldering materials the week before the fire. 
Robinson testified no contract provision allowed for roof storage of materials and 
that Pickens did not receive permission from Winthrop to store materials on the flat 
roof. Robinson recalled Pickens stored sheet metal, metal fasteners, and rolls of 
felt paper on wooden pallets on the flat roof during his project inspections, but he 
did not go on the roof the day before the fire.  Robinson admitted he did not know 
about the requirements of NFPA 241 addressing storage of materials and was not 
familiar with the regulations, even though he acknowledged the contract required 
Pickens to comply with all applicable codes.  
Similarly, Bobby testified that the specifications allowed for storage of materials in 
only two locations on the ground and that Pickens did not have specific permission 
from Winthrop for roof storage.  Bobby also acknowledged that the South Carolina 
Fire Code applied to the project, stating he was familiar with material storage rules, 
although he did not know the particular NFPA standard prohibiting yard storage of 
materials within thirty feet of a structure.  He testified Randall and Robinson 
should have known the applicable laws for the storage of combustible materials.  
Additionally, Stafford engineer Vu Nguyen testified Stafford was not aware that 
Pickens stored materials on the flat roof and that Pickens did not get approval for 
this storage space at the pre-construction meeting.  Wesley Love, Winthrop's 
project manager for the Bancroft Hall reroof, testified Pickens did not ask to store 
material on the flat roof, Winthrop did not provide permission, and Winthrop did 
not know about the overnight storage of materials.  Love also testified he did not 
monitor Pickens's work for safety, and he did not consider himself a fire prevention 
program superintendent for the Bancroft Hall roof project, nor did he designate any 
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other Winthrop employee with the title.3  Walter Hardin, Winthrop's vice president 
of facilities management, testified that no Winthrop employee was designated with 
the title of fire prevention program superintendent.  Hardin explained, "That was 
handled through our specifications through Stafford which puts that responsibility 
on [Pickens]." Hardin stated Winthrop relied on Pickens to comply with applicable 
roofing laws.   
Finally, Daniel Arnold, who was qualified as an expert in fire safety and fire 
spread analysis, testified he visited Winthrop three or four days after the fire and 
interacted with origin investigator Driggers.  Arnold found the evidence from the 
fire was consistent with the conclusion that the fire started on the flat roof between 
Bancroft Hall and Owens Hall.  Arnold testified about pictures depicting the height 
the flames reached, opining that the flame height demonstrated that the fire spread 
from the flat roof to the pitched roofs.  According to Arnold, the flames could not 
have reached the height of the pitched roofs without the presence of combustible 
materials on the flat roof.  Arnold maintained it was possible to analyze how the 
fire spread without knowing the ignition source of the fire.  He explained that a fire 
would have self-extinguished on the flat roof and would not have spread if other 
combustible materials were not stored on the roof because the roof by itself was 
designed to withstand the spread of fire.  Arnold opined to a reasonable degree of 
engineering certainty that the fire would not have spread from the flat roof to the 
adjoining pitched roofs but for the presence of combustible materials.  Arnold also 
testified that the International Fire Code and NFPA 241 were adopted in the South 
Carolina Code; the NFPA provided guidelines for minimizing fire damage during 
construction or renovation projects and contained a specific provision restricting 
the storage of combustible materials within thirty feet of a construction project.  He 
confirmed that roofing paper and wooden pallets were combustible materials, and 
that any materials stored on the flat roof would have been less than thirty feet from
the Bancroft Hall construction project.   
After Winthrop closed its case, Pickens moved for a directed verdict on the issue of 
liability, arguing Winthrop failed to prove causation.  Specifically, Pickens argued 
Winthrop introduced no evidence of how the fire began.  Pickens claimed that 
3 Section 7.2 of NFPA 241 provides for the responsibilities of an owner—here, 
Winthrop—in ensuring fire safety:  "The owner shall designate a person who shall 
be responsible for the fire prevention program and who shall insure that it is 
carried out to completion."    
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Winthrop relied on a "spread theory" of liability to prove its case, which is not 
recognized in South Carolina.  Because Winthrop failed to provide evidence that 
the fire would not have occurred but for Pickens's actions, Pickens argued that 
Winthrop failed to meet its burden of proof as a matter of law.  Pickens further 
contended that it was unforeseeable that the storage of materials that would be 
installed on the roof would cause a fire because they were no more combustible 
than the roof itself or other building components.   
The circuit court denied the directed verdict motion, reasoning that there was 
evidence from which the jury could find Pickens's negligence or breach of contract 
proximately caused Winthrop's damages.  The circuit court further held there was 
evidence from which the jury could find the fire would not have caused such 
extensive damages but for the presence of combustibles.  Initially, the circuit court 
stated this was "an issue of novel impression probably in South Carolina," and the 
case was not a "spread theory" liability case because it involved a contract for a 
worksite and a statutory duty, not the common law duty of a landowner to prevent 
the foreseeable spread of fire to neighboring landowners.  The circuit court further 
found the ignition source insignificant because the fire started on the flat roof, the 
statutes were designed to prevent the spread of fire by prohibiting the storage of 
combustible materials in certain areas near construction sites, and there was 
evidence from which a jury could find the combustible materials caused most of 
the damage because the expert testified the fire would not have spread from the flat 
roof but for the presence of combustible materials.   
After closing arguments as to liability, the circuit court charged the jury on the 
applicable law. As part of its charge, the circuit court instructed the jury on the 
definition of proximate cause, foreseeability, and direct cause:  
Proximate cause requires proof of both causation [in] fact 
and legal cause. Causation [in] fact is proved by 
establishing the plaintiff's damages would not have 
occurred but for the defendant's negligence.  Legal cause 
is proved by establishing foreseeability.  The touchstone 
of proximate cause in South Carolina is foreseeability.  
That is the foreseeability of some damage from a 
negligent act or omission is a prerequisite to it being a 
proximate cause of the damage for which recovery is 
sought. The test for foreseeability is whether some 
damage to another is the natural and probable 
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consequence of the complained of act.  A defendant may 
be held for anything which appears to have been a natural 
and probable consequence of its negligence.  For an act
to be [a] proximate cause of damages[,] the damages 
must be a foreseeable consequence of the act.  
Foreseeability is not determined from hindsight, but 
rather from the defendant's [perspective] at the time of 
the complained of act.  The law requires only reasonable 
foresight. When the damages complained of are not 
reasonably foreseeable in the exercise of due care[,] there 
is no liability.
After some deliberation, the jury sent the circuit court a note requesting to be 
recharged on the "definition of proximate cause."  The circuit court gave the 
following recharge on proximate cause, which repeated a portion of its earlier 
charge: 
Now, as to proximate cause, I charged you previously 
that even if you find that the plaintiff has proved the
defendant to have been negligent they would not be 
entitled to a verdict unless you further found that the 
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries. Proximate cause does not mean the
soul [sic] cause.  The defendant's conduct can be a 
proximate cause if it was at least one of the direct 
concurring causes of the injury. The law defines 
proximate cause to be something that produces a natural 
chain of events which in the end brings about the injury . 
. . or damage. In other words proximate cause is a direct 
cause without which the damage would not have 
occurred. Okay. Anything else that you need while we 
are out? 
The foreperson replied, "No, that answers it." 
Pickens objected, arguing the circuit court erred in failing to include a discussion 
of foreseeability in the recharge on proximate cause.  The circuit court responded 
the jury "didn't ask for that" and explained that because the jury asked for a 
definition of proximate cause, it did not complicate the definition by including 
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foreseeability. The circuit court also stated, "They heard it all the first time.  They 
asked me to [define] proximate cause and when I finished reading the forelady was 
shaking her head yes, so I figured that is all they want.  I asked do you want any 
more than that." 
The jury found against Pickens on both the breach of contract and negligence 
causes of action. The jury also determined that Winthrop was forty percent 
comparatively negligent.  Pickens moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
(JNOV), arguing again that the case should not have been submitted to the jury 
because Winthrop did not present any evidence on the issue of causation.  The 
circuit denied the motion.
The trial continued into the damages phase.  Six witnesses testified about the fire 
and water damages resulting from the fire as well as the payments to contractors 
completing the repairs.4  Pickens did not present any evidence as to damages but 
again moved for a directed verdict, arguing Winthrop failed to prove how its 
breach of duty made the damages worse.  Pickens argued the evidence showed 
only that Pickens caused the fire to spread, and Winthrop failed to connect 
Pickens's actions to the damages. The circuit court denied the directed verdict 
motion, ruling that evidence existed from which the jury could determine that 
Pickens's actions caused all of the damages.  The court based its reasoning on the 
testimony that the fire would have been contained in the flat roof area but for the 
improper combustible material storage and the testimony that substantial damages 
resulted from the firefighters' inability to extinguish the fire after it spread.   
The jury returned a damages verdict in the amount of $7,223,343.14. Pickens 
raised several post-trial motions.  Pickens again moved for JNOV, asserting 
Winthrop failed to provide adequate proof of the cause of the fire during the 
liability phase. Pickens also renewed its directed verdict motion as to damages, 
arguing Winthrop failed to prove which damages were caused by the spread of the 
fire. Additionally, Pickens moved for a new trial absolute based on the circuit 
court's error in bifurcating the trial, arguing it was inappropriate for the jury to 
consider proximate cause and damages separately.  Pickens also moved for a new 
trial absolute based on the denial of its motion to strike Juror 25 for cause.  In the 
alternative, Pickens requested that the circuit court enter a judgment governed by 
the jury's comparative negligence determination, advancing the theory that the 
4 Winthrop also admitted into evidence a binder documenting its specific damages
by category. 
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 breach of duty supporting the negligence verdict was the same as that existing in 
the contract. Thus, it was proper for the court to apportion comparative negligence 
under both the negligence and breach of contract causes of action.   
The circuit court denied the motion for a new trial absolute on the juror issue, 
explaining that the juror did not have a close connection that required it to strike 
her for cause and that Pickens failed to show prejudice because it struck the juror 
with a peremptory strike.  The circuit court found the bifurcation proper, denied 
Pickens's JNOV motions, and determined Winthrop had a right to elect its remedy.  
Winthrop elected to recover for breach of contract, and the circuit court entered 
judgment in the amount of $7,223,343.14. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the circuit court err in denying Pickens's motion for a new trial based on 
the court's refusal to strike Juror 25 for cause? 
 
II. Did the circuit court err in denying Pickens's directed verdict motion as to 
liability because Winthrop failed to present evidence of causation? 
 
III. Did the circuit court err in failing to repeat a jury charge on foreseeability 
following the jury's request for additional instruction on proximate cause? 
 
IV. Did the circuit court err in bifurcating the liability and damages phases of the 
trial? 
 
V.		 Did the circuit court err in denying Pickens's directed verdict motion as to 
damages because Winthrop failed to present evidence establishing Pickens's 
conduct worsened the damages resulting from the fire?  
 
VI. 		 Did the circuit court err in failing to adjust the jury's damages verdict 
according to its comparative negligence finding? 
ANALYSIS 
I. 		 Juror Strike 
Pickens argues the circuit court erred in denying its motion for a new trial based on 
the court's refusal to strike Juror 25 for cause.  Specifically, Pickens asserts the 
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circuit court should have struck Juror 25 for cause—despite her statement that she 
could remain impartial—because she was a "student researcher" and a "recent 
graduate" of Winthrop who knew about the fire and knew people affected by the 
fire. Pickens argues the failure to strike Juror 25 mandated a new trial because 
Pickens did not have a panel of impartial jurors and was forced to use a peremptory 
strike on a biased juror. We disagree. 
"A litigant's right to an impartial jury is a fundamental principle of our legal 
system."  Burke v. AnMed Health, 393 S.C. 48, 52, 710 S.E.2d 84, 86 (Ct. App. 
2011). "[I]n all civil cases any party shall have the right to demand a panel of 
twenty competent and impartial jurors from which to strike a jury."  S.C. Code 
Ann. § 14-7-1050 (Supp. 2015). "To safeguard this right, prospective jurors must 
be excused for cause when . . . the [circuit] court determines that the juror cannot 
be fair and impartial."  Burke, 393 S.C. at 53, 710 S.E.2d at 86.  A court should 
disqualify a juror "[i]f it appears to the court that the juror is not indifferent in the 
cause." S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1020 (Supp. 2015).  "The decision [to disqualify a 
juror] is within the sound discretion of the [circuit court]." Abofreka v. Alston 
Tobacco Co., 288 S.C. 122, 125, 341 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1986).
In Abofreka, our supreme court found that a prior business relationship between a 
juror and a party does not disqualify the juror as a matter of law.  Id. at 125, 341 
S.E.2d at 624. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in failing to 
disqualify challenged jurors who had been patients of Abofreka because the jurors 
stated they could be fair to both sides.  Id. 
In Hollins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the circuit court denied Hollins's request to 
strike for cause a juror whose brother worked at the Wal-Mart where the incident 
occurred. 381 S.C. 245, 248–49, 672 S.E.2d 805, 806 (Ct. App. 2008).  This court 
held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the juror 
because Hollins had the opportunity to fully question the juror, who responded that
she had no knowledge of the matter, had not discussed it with her brother, and 
could be fair and impartial. Id. at 252, 672 S.E.2d at 808.    
We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in failing to strike Juror 
25 for cause. Initially, we find that Pickens's argument that the trial court erred in 
refusing to strike Juror 25 for cause because she was a "student researcher" is 
unpreserved because it was not specifically raised to and ruled on by the trial court.  
See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("[A]n 
objection must be sufficiently specific to inform the [circuit] court of the point 
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being urged by the objector."). As to Pickens's preserved objections to Juror 25, 
we do not find that Juror 25's status as a Winthrop graduate required her removal 
because she stated the relationship would not interfere with her ability to remain 
impartial.  See Abofreka, 288 S.C. at 125, 341 S.E.2d at 624.  Although Juror 25 
had been on campus when the fire occurred and knew people affected by it, she did 
not appear to have any special knowledge about the fire, and she affirmed that she 
could decide the case impartially based upon the evidence presented at trial.  Based 
on her responses to the voir dire questions, we cannot say the circuit court abused 
its discretion in refusing to strike this juror for cause.  See Burke, 393 S.C. at 53, 
710 S.E.2d at 86 ("[P]rospective jurors must be excused for cause when . . . the 
[circuit] court determines that the juror cannot be fair and impartial.").   
Moreover, as Juror 25 was not empaneled, Pickens did not suffer prejudice from 
any error in failing to strike the juror. See Wilson v. Childs, 315 S.C. 431, 439, 434 
S.E.2d 286, 291 (Ct. App. 1993) ("There is no reversible error in the impaneling of 
a jury unless it appears that the objecting party was prejudiced."); Moore v. 
Jenkins, 304 S.C. 544, 547, 405 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1991) ("[W]ith regard to errors in 
the empaneling of juries, this Court has previously stated in reviewing such errors 
that, 'irregularities in the empaneling of the jury will not constitute reversible error 
unless it affirmatively appears that the objecting party was prejudiced thereby.'"
(quoting S. Welding Works, Inc. v. K & S Constr. Co., 286 S.C. 158, 162, 332 
S.E.2d 102, 105 (Ct. App. 1985))). 
II. Directed Verdict—Liability 
Pickens next argues that the circuit court erred in denying its directed verdict 
motion during the trial's liability phase because Winthrop failed to present 
evidence of causation.  Specifically, Pickens asserts Winthrop's causes of action 
fail as a matter of law because it could not prove, even with circumstantial 
evidence, that Pickens caused the fire to ignite.  Pickens claims Winthrop relied on 
a "spread theory" of liability to support causation because it had no evidence of an 
ignition source, noting South Carolina has never recognized liability under a 
"spread theory." Further, Pickens asserts Winthrop failed to prove causation 
because "its storage of the very materials that would shortly be installed on the roof 
of Bancroft Hall does not create a foreseeable risk of fire ignition that is any 
greater than that borne by the building generally."  Pickens contends that the 
absence of foreseeability is fatal to Winthrop's causes of action because 
foreseeability is crucial in fire cases in which the ignition source is unknown.   
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"A motion for JNOV may be granted only if no reasonable jury could have reached 
the challenged verdict."  Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 149, 742 S.E.2d 644, 
649 (2013) (quoting Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 300, 536 S.E.2d 408, 419 (Ct. 
App. 2000)). "On appeal from a circuit court's denial of a motion for a directed 
verdict or a JNOV, we apply the same standard as the circuit court by viewing the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party."  Id.  "We will not reverse the circuit court's ruling on a JNOV 
motion unless there is no evidence to support the ruling or where the ruling is 
controlled by an error of law."  Id. (citing Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 
434–35, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006)).   
To recover in breach of contract and negligence actions, a plaintiff must show the 
defendant's actions caused its damages. See Maro v. Lewis, 389 S.C. 216, 222, 697 
S.E.2d 684, 688 (Ct. App. 2010) (providing that to establish a breach of contract, 
the plaintiff must prove the contract, its breach, and the damages that "follow as a 
natural consequence and a proximate result of such breach") (quoting Fuller v. E. 
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 240 S.C. 75, 89, 124 S.E.2d 602, 610 (1962)); Madison ex 
rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 146, 638 S.E.2d 650, 662 (2006) 
("Negligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the injury."); 
Dropkin v. Beachwalk Villas Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 373 S.C. 360, 363, 644 S.E.2d 
808, 810 (Ct. App. 2007) (providing a plaintiff must prove a causal connection 
between the defendant's violation of a statute and its injury to be entitled to 
damages for negligence per se). 
"Proximate cause requires proof of both causation in fact and legal cause."  
Madison, 371 S.C. at 146, 638 S.E.2d at 662. "Causation in fact is proved by 
establishing the injury would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's negligence.  
Legal cause is proved by establishing foreseeability."  Id. at 147, 638 S.E.2d at 
662. "The touchstone of proximate cause is foreseeability which is determined by 
looking to the natural and probable consequences of the defendant's conduct."  
Gause, 403 S.C. at 150, 742 S.E.2d at 649.  "Proximate cause is normally a 
question of fact for determination by the jury, and may be proved by direct or 
circumstantial evidence." Id. (quoting Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600, 606, 193 
S.E.2d 531, 533 (1972)).
"Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon to establish liability, the plaintiff 
must show such circumstances as would justify the inference that his injuries were 
due to the negligent act of the defendant, and not leave the question to mere 
conjecture or speculation." McQuillen v. Dobbs, 262 S.C. 386, 392, 204 S.E.2d 
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732, 735 (1974) (quoting Chaney v. Burgess, 246 S.C. 161, 143 S.E.2d 521 
(1965)). In McQuillen, after a fire destroyed his personal possessions, a mobile 
home tenant sued the owner for negligence in failing to properly inspect and 
maintain a fuel oil furnace. Id. at 388, 204 S.E.2d at 735. The owner moved for a 
directed verdict, arguing the plaintiff provided no evidence that his negligence 
proximately caused the fire or resulting damages.  Id. The supreme court affirmed 
the denial of the directed verdict motion, holding that although no direct evidence 
showed what caused the fire, the plaintiff provided evidence of facts and 
circumstances from which a jury could reasonably infer the fire would not have 
occurred but for the defendant's negligence.  Id. at 391–93, 204 S.E.2d at 735–36.
In Thorburn v. Spartanburg Theatres, Inc., the plaintiff sued for negligent 
maintenance of an electrical system, and the defendant argued the circuit court 
erred in submitting the issue to the jury because there was no direct testimony as to 
the cause of a fire and the jury's conclusion that it was an electrical fire was 
speculative and unsupported by the evidence.  263 S.C. 165, 168–69, 208 S.E.2d 
919, 920 (1974). Our supreme court was "convinced that the evidence warranted a 
reasonable inference that the fire was caused by defendant's failure to properly 
maintain the electrical system, which required submission of the case to the jury, 
even though the evidence did not exclude all possibility of some other cause of 
plaintiff's injury."  Id. at 169, 208 S.E.2d at 920. 
We are likewise convinced that the circuit court properly submitted this issue to the 
jury. To establish proximate cause, Winthrop needed to provide evidence that 
Pickens's breach of duty—here, the storage of combustible materials on the flat 
roof—was a cause in fact of the damages and was a legal cause. 
Here, there was evidence that the fire would not have occurred but for Pickens's
negligence. The parties stipulated that the fire began on the flat roof.  Arnold 
provided expert testimony that the flames on the flat roof would not have reached 
the height they reached and consequently spread to the pitched roofs but for the 
presence of combustibles.  Arnold also testified that the fire would have self-
extinguished on the flat roof without the presence of combustibles.  Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Winthrop, this constitutes evidence 
warranting a reasonable inference that the presence of improperly placed 
combustible materials was a direct cause of the fire damages, as the fire would not 
have spread to either of the pitched roofs nor caused significant damages but for 
Pickens's acts. 
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Moreover, we find there was evidence to submit to the jury that the damages were
foreseeable.  Like the circuit court, we find unpersuasive Pickens's argument that 
the damages were unforeseeable because the work crew left the exact materials that 
would eventually compose the Bancroft Hall roof on the flat roof.  The fire code 
specifically prohibits the storage of combustible materials near a construction site, 
and one of the stated purposes of the fire code is to prevent the spread of fire.  
Because a reasonable inference could be drawn that the storage of prohibited 
combustible materials near a construction project could cause the quick spread of a 
fire, the question of foreseeability was properly submitted to the jury. See id. 
("Proximate cause is normally a question of fact for determination by the jury, and 
may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence." (quoting Player, 259 S.C. at 
606, 193 S.E.2d at 533)).
Pickens argues that Winthrop's claims failed as a matter of law because Winthrop 
could not identify the specific ignition source for the roof fire.  However, here, as 
in Thorburn, "the circumstances under which the fire originated and its destructive 
effect precluded direct proof of its cause."  263 S.C. at 168, 208 S.E.2d 920; see 
also Scavens v. Macks Stores, Inc, 577 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating direct 
testimony of fire chief, expert testimony, and "circumstantial evidence tending to 
indicate a gas fire had occurred" provided sufficient factual basis from which jury 
"could have reasonably concluded that the fire resulted from the ignition of a 
combustible mixture of air and natural gas.  The jury could also have reasonably 
concluded that any one of the identified potential sources of ignition could have 
ignited the fire and that, since the store contained no other source of natural gas, a 
leak in the gas heater line provided the natural gas."). Accordingly, we do not view 
the question of the specific ignition source fatal to Winthrop's claims; we find 
Winthrop provided the necessary direct and circumstantial evidence to establish 
causation of the fire damages and support the submission of this issue to the jury.  
III. Jury Charge 
Pickens argues the circuit court erred in failing to give the jury a complete charge 
on proximate cause following the jury's request for a recharge.  Pickens complains 
the circuit court prejudiced it by omitting the "touchstone" of the definition of 
proximate cause—foreseeability.  Pickens asserts that the charge was particularly 
important because the cause of the fire was the primary issue in the case, and the 
circuit court's failure to give a complete instruction on both elements of proximate 
cause misguided the jury, led to potential juror confusion, and prejudiced Pickens.  
We disagree. 
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"In reviewing an alleged error in jury instructions, we are mindful that an appellate 
court will not reverse the trial court's decision absent an abuse of discretion."  Pope 
v. Heritage Cmtys., Inc., 395 S.C. 404, 414, 717 S.E.2d 765, 770 (Ct. App. 2011).  
"In order to warrant reversal for refusal of the [circuit court] to give requested jury 
instructions, such refusal must have been both erroneous and prejudicial."  Horry 
Cty. v. Laychur, 315 S.C. 364, 368, 434 S.E.2d 259, 262 (1993).  "When the jury 
requests additional charges, it is sufficient for the court to charge only the parts of 
the initial charge which are necessary to answer the jury's request."  Rauch v. 
Zayas, 284 S.C. 594, 597, 327 S.E.2d 377, 378 (Ct. App. 1985).  "Its failure to 
charge in greater detail is not error if the details were fully covered in the original 
charge." Id. "Moreover, an alleged error in a portion of the charge must be 
prejudicial to the appellant to warrant a new trial." Id.
Here, the circuit court's original charge contained a lengthy explanation of 
proximate cause, which included an explanation of foreseeability.  When the jury 
requested additional instruction on the definition of proximate cause, the circuit 
court gave a more succinct definition, defining proximate cause as "something that 
produces a natural chain of events which in the end brings about the injury" and "a 
direct cause without which the damage would not have occurred."  This is an 
accurate statement of the law. See McNair v. Rainsford, 330 S.C. 332, 349, 499 
S.E.2d 488, 497 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Proximate cause is the efficient or direct cause 
of an injury."). The portion charged was responsive to the jury's recharge request. 
See Rauch, 284 S.C. at 597, 327 S.E.2d at 378 ("When the jury requests additional 
charges, it is sufficient for the court to charge only the parts of the initial charge 
which are necessary to answer the jury's request."). Accordingly, we find no error 
in the circuit court's recharge. 
IV. Bifurcation 
Pickens contends the circuit court erred in bifurcating the trial because causation 
and damages were inextricably intertwined.  Pickens asserts considerations of 
judicial economy and convenience should not have outweighed its right to a fair 
trial in which the jury could have considered causation and damages together.   
"This court must review a trial judge's decision to bifurcate the issues of liability 
and damages under an 'abuse of discretion' standard."  Creighton v. Coligny Plaza 
Ltd. P'ship, 334 S.C. 96, 108, 512 S.E.2d 510, 516 (Ct. App. 1998).  Rule 42(b), 
SCRCP, provides: 
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The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid 
prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to 
expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of 
any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party 
claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of 
claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, 
or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by 
jury as declared by the Constitution or as given by a 
statute of the State. 
Rule 42(b), SCRCP. "A trial should be bifurcated only if the issues are so distinct 
that trial of each alone would not result in injustice." Creighton, 334 S.C. at 108, 
512 S.E.2d at 516. "Where evidence relevant to the issues of both liability and 
damages overlap, bifurcation is inappropriate."  Id. 
We find the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in bifurcating the trial.  
Because most of the damages witnesses would not be called during the liability 
phase, the circuit court reasoned it would save time and resources by trying the 
liability phase separately.  We find the bases for the circuit court's ruling— 
convenience and judicial economy—are legitimate reasons for bifurcation.  See 
Rule 42(b), SCRCP. 
Moreover, we do not find bifurcation resulted in injustice to Pickens because the 
liability and damages evidence did not overlap.  Indeed, the evidence presented 
during the damages phase was limited to topics such as the documentation of 
Winthrop's damages; cleanup, reconstruction, and electronics restoration; and the 
invoices from and payments to those performing such work after the fire.  Thus, 
bifurcation was appropriate. 
V. Directed Verdict—Damages 
Pickens argues the circuit court erred in denying its directed verdict motion in the 
damages phase because Winthrop failed to provide evidence for the jury to 
determine with reasonable certainty the damages caused by Pickens.  Specifically, 
Pickens asserts that the jury did not have any evidence of the cost of repairs for 
Winthrop absent Pickens's breach of duty and erroneously held Pickens liable for 
all of Winthrop's losses in the fire even though under Winthrop's theory, Pickens's
actions merely aggravated the fire damages.  We disagree.  
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"Generally, in order for damages to be recoverable, the evidence should be such as 
to enable the court or jury to determine the amount thereof with reasonable 
certainty or accuracy." Whisenant v. James Island Corp., 277 S.C. 10, 13, 281 
S.E.2d 794, 796 (1981). "The existence, causation, and amount of damages cannot 
be left to conjecture, guess, or speculation." Pope, 395 S.C. at 434, 717 S.E.2d at 
781. "Actual or compensatory damages include compensation for all injuries 
which are naturally the proximate result of the alleged wrongful conduct of the 
defendant." Mellen v. Lane, 377 S.C. 261, 287, 659 S.E.2d 236, 250 (Ct. App. 
2008). "An owner can recover for property destroyed or damaged by fire such 
damages as will restore him to the same property status that he occupied before his 
property was burned."  Nelson v. Coleman Co., 249 S.C. 652, 659, 155 S.E.2d 917, 
921 (1967). 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Winthrop, we find the circuit 
court did not err in submitting the damages issue to the jury. See Pope, 395 S.C. at 
434, 717 S.E.2d at 781. Pickens does not challenge the evidence of the amount of 
damages Winthrop suffered from the fire.  Rather, Pickens complains about a lack 
of evidence of causation of the damages, asserting Winthrop's evidence did not 
enable the jury to determine with reasonable certainty the amount of damages 
attributable to Pickens's actions.  Although Pickens suggests it could have caused 
only a portion of the damages due to its role in the spread or exacerbation of the 
fire, Winthrop's expert testified that the fire would not have spread and would have 
completely extinguished, except on the flat roof area, but for the presence of the 
improperly placed combustibles.  This testimony alone provides sufficient 
evidence to support the circuit court's submission of the damages question to the 
jury. Winthrop produced the testimony of six witnesses as well as a binder of 
invoices encompassing the repair and reconstruction costs, from which the jury 
was able to determine damages with reasonable certainty.  Accordingly, we find 
the circuit court properly denied Pickens's directed verdict motion as to damages.   
VI. Comparative Negligence and Breach of Contract 
Finally, Pickens argues the circuit court erred in failing to adjust the jury's damages 
verdict for breach of contract in accordance with its comparative negligence 
determination.  Pickens asserts the breach of contract claim is coextensive with the 
negligence claim because the contract merely acknowledged certain duties 
imposed by statute rather than imposing new obligations on Pickens.  Pickens 
contends it would violate public policy for "a contracting party to essentially 
incorporate by reference the duties to which the opposing party is otherwise bound 
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by law into a contract and thereby escape an apportionment of liability for his own 
contributions to a particular loss."  We disagree.
"Election of remedies is the act of choosing between different remedies allowed by 
law on the same state of facts." Inman v. Imperial Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 303 
S.C. 10, 13, 397 S.E.2d 774, 776 (Ct. App. 1990).  "It is a fundamental rule of law 
in this state that there can be no double recovery for a single wrong."  Id. 
"Plaintiffs may only recover once for their actual damages."  Id.  "If multiple 
causes of action are raised on the same set of facts, the plaintiff may be required to 
elect his remedy to prevent a double recovery for a single wrong."  Harbin v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 316 S.C. 423, 429, 450 S.E.2d 112, 115 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
In Ritter & Associates, Inc. v. Buchanan Volkswagen, Inc., Ritter sued BVW for 
breach of contract, negligence, and negligent supervision for damages it caused in 
a check kiting scheme. 405 S.C. 643, 648, 748 S.E.2d 801, 804 (Ct. App. 2013).  
The special referee found in favor of Ritter on its breach of contract claim and 
awarded $434,000 in damages, but granted judgment in favor of BVW on the 
negligence causes of action because the "allegations of negligence and negligent 
supervision were merely examples of the nonperformance of the contractual 
obligations between the parties." Id.  On appeal, BVW argued the special referee 
erred in failing to apportion liability to Ritter based on its own negligent business 
practices, asserting "[e]ven though the basis for the award sounds in contract, the 
negligence on Ritter's part can serve to mitigate or even entirely subsume the 
amount of the award."  Id. at 651, 748 S.E.2d at 805. However, this court held the 
apportionment theory inapplicable because comparative negligence applies only to 
a plaintiff in a negligence action, and Ritter recovered under a breach of contract 
theory. Id. 
Pickens argues comparative negligence should govern the damages award "because 
there [was] truly no legal distinction in the breach of the duty that [was]
occasioned in the breach of contract cause of action and the negligence cause of 
action in this particular case."  Pickens asserts Ritter is distinguishable because 
only contract liability existed in that case; thus, it did not involve an election of 
damages, whereas the jury here found Pickens liable in contract and tort.  We agree 
that the situation is distinguishable; however, we nonetheless find Winthrop could 
properly elect to recover the non-apportioned damages awarded for breach of 
contract. See Ritter, 405 S.C. at 651, 748 S.E.2d at 805 ("[U]nder South Carolina 
law, the doctrine of comparative negligence is only applicable to cases alleging 
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negligence as a cause of action.").  South Carolina's precedent that comparative 
negligence is inapplicable to a breach of contract theory governs this situation.  
Although Pickens argues this case presents a unique factual situation requiring an 
exception to the rule, it cites no persuasive authority to support its public policy 
argument. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the circuit court. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is 
AFFIRMED. 

SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 
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LOCKEMY, C.J.: Ronnie D. Dennis and Jeanette Dennis (Appellants) appeal the 
circuit court's grant of the Callawassie Island Members Club, Inc.'s motion for 
summary judgment.  We reverse and remand to the circuit court. 
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 1999, Appellants purchased property on Callawassie Island, a private island 
located between Beaufort and Hilton Head Island. They also purchased a 
membership in the Callawassie Island Club (CIC).  The provisions governing 
membership in CIC were memorialized in the Plan for Offering of Memberships in 
the Callawassie Island Club (CIC Plan). In 2001, CIC members purchased the 
club's assets and took over operation of the club under a new name, the 
Callawassie Island Members Club (CIMC).  In conjunction with the purchase, 
CIMC issued an amended plan for offering of membership (CIMC Plan) and 
established its own general club rules (GCR) and bylaws.   
In November 2010, Appellants stopped paying dues to CIMC, asserting their 
tender of a letter of resignation to CIMC relieved them of any further obligation to 
CIMC. Thereafter, in August 2011, CIMC filed a breach of contract action against 
Appellants for the collection of unpaid dues, fees, assessments, and other charges.  
CIMC asserted the CIMC Plan, like the CIC Plan before it, required resigned 
members remain in good standing with CIMC until their memberships were 
reissued by CIMC. CIMC maintained Appellants were CIMC members and were
bound by the CIMC Plan. According to CIMC, Appellants paid a $4,000 
assessment required of members at the time of the transfer of assets from CIC to 
CIMC, were issued a membership certificate to CIMC, and continued to enjoy 
membership privileges for a number of years.   
Appellants answered the complaint, alleging they were informed by CIMC 
management that club members who joined prior to 2001 would not be required to 
maintain a membership but could resign their membership at the member's
discretion.  Appellants further asserted the GCRs provide that members not paying 
dues will be suspended for four months, and members whose accounts are not 
settled within those four months shall be expelled from CIMC.  Appellants asserted 
the GCRs provide that dues and fees do not accumulate as a result of an expulsion.  
Appellants also claimed CIMC did not maintain a fair and reasonable process for 
the termination of memberships, failed to allow members to approve fundamental 
changes to members' rights, failed to act in good faith, and made material 
misrepresentations to Appellants.  Additionally, Appellants asserted counterclaims
for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation.  
On September 30, 2013, CIMC filed a motion for summary judgment.  CIMC 
argued its contracts with Appellants (including the CIMC Plan, the GCRs, and the 
bylaws) were unambiguous in their collective requirement that a member must 
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remain in good standing with CIMC until his membership is reissued.  CIMC 
further argued the South Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act1 (the Act) provides 
that a member is not relieved from any obligations which were incurred, or 
commitments which were made, while he was still a member.  
Following a hearing in November 2013, the circuit court granted CIMC's motion 
for summary judgment on January 15, 2014.  The court found CIMC's governing 
documents were unambiguous and clearly required a resigned member to pay dues 
until his membership is reissued.  The court further found there was no evidence of 
fraud or bad faith on the part of the CIMC Board of Directors (CIMC Board), and 
the Act clearly provides that a member cannot void a contractual undertaking 
simply by leaving a club.  The court also found CIMC was entitled to summary 
judgment on Appellants' breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation 
claims.  The court awarded CIMC $51,131.76 in unpaid dues and attorney's fees.  
Thereafter, Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, objecting to the form of 
the summary judgment order and the legal standard employed by the court in 
reaching its determination. They alleged there were questions of fact for the jury to 
decide, including what documents apply and bind the parties; what documents 
constitute a contract between the parties; the amount of damages owed; whether 
CIMC is bound by statements of its agents that Appellants would accumulate no 
more than four months of dues and fees before being expelled; whether it violates 
state law for Appellants to be treated differently than other similarly situated 
members; and whether it violates state law to not allow Appellants to resign.  
Following a hearing in May 2014, the circuit court issued an amended order, once 
again granting CIMC summary judgment and denying Appellants' motion to 
reconsider. This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, the appellate court 
applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP, 
which provides that summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 
(2002). In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from it must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
1 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 33-31-101 to -1708 (Supp. 2015).   
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the nonmoving party. Sauner v. Pub. Serv. Auth. of S.C., 354 S.C. 397, 404, 581 
S.E.2d 161, 165 (2003). To withstand a motion for summary judgment in cases
applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the nonmoving party 
is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence.  Hancock v. Mid-South 
Mgmt. Co., Inc., 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Issues of Fact 
Appellants argue the circuit court erred in failing to apply the "mere scintilla" 
standard and disregarding evidence of genuine issues of material fact.   
A.  Contractual Relationship 
First, Appellants contend a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether they have a 
contractual relationship with CIMC.  Appellants argue there is no evidence their 
CIC membership was transferred to CIMC.  They maintain they signed a purchase 
agreement with CIC in 1999 and never entered into any membership agreement 
with CIMC. Conversely, CIMC argues Appellants' CIMC membership is 
evidenced by their payment of a $4,000 assessment associated with the transfer of 
CIC to CIMC and the issuance of a membership certificate to Appellants.2  CIMC 
also argues Appellants' CIMC membership is evidenced by their admission of their 
continued use of CIMC amenities and their admission that they had a duty to pay 
dues to CIMC until their membership was resigned, transferred back to CIMC, or 
as otherwise terminated as allowed by the governing documents. 
We hold a question of fact does not exist as to whether Appellants were members 
of CIMC. The evidence in the record supports the circuit court's finding that 
Appellants' membership in CIC transferred to CIMC upon the sale of the club.  We 
note the 1994 CIC Plan expressly contemplated the transfer of CIC assets to the 
membership, which occurred in 2001 when CIMC assumed control.  Appellants 
also admitted in their answer that they received benefits from their membership
until their resignation.  
2 Appellants do not address this assertion in their brief, and we were unable to find 
any evidence of this claim in the record.   
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B.  Governing Documents 
Appellants assert there are genuine disputes as to (1) which governing documents 
are controlling, and (2) the interpretation and application of the governing 
documents as they relate to Appellants' obligations to pay dues.   
Appellants argue the circuit court referenced several CIMC documents (including 
the 2007, 2008, and 2009 amended GCRs, as well as the 2001, 2007, 2008, and 
2012 amended CIMC Plans and the 2001 Bylaws) but failed to identify which 
documents were controlling.  Appellants contend that in granting summary 
judgment, the circuit court relied upon language from various amended documents 
but applied its analysis with no uniformity or consistency.  They further assert that 
although the court found the governing documents were unambiguous, it failed to 
specify which documents were unambiguous.   
CIMC maintains the following documents were provided to the circuit court at the 
November 2013 hearing:  the 1994 CIC Plan; the 2001, 2007, and 2008 CIMC 
Plans; and the 1994 GCRs and bylaws.  CIMC further contends it provided all of 
the amended versions of these documents to the court at the May 2014 hearing.  
We find the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because there is 
some ambiguity in the governing documents as to whether club members are liable 
for dues accruing after resignation. See Cafe Associates, Ltd. v. Gerngross, 305 
S.C. 6, 9, 406 S.E.2d 162, 164 (1991) ("As a general rule, written contracts are to 
be construed by the Court; but where a contract is ambiguous or capable of more 
than one construction, the question of what the parties intended becomes one of 
fact, and the question should be submitted to the jury.").   
Specifically, the 1994 GCRs provide:
Any member may terminate membership in the Club by 
delivering to the Club's Secretary written notice of 
termination in accordance with the By-laws.  
Notwithstanding termination, the member shall remain 
liable for any unpaid club account, membership dues and 
charges (including any food and beverage minimums).  
However, unlike the 1994 GCRs, the 1994 CIC Plan and Bylaws provide resigned 
members are obligated to continue to pay dues until their memberships are 
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reissued. Further ambiguity is found is in the 2009 GCRs, which provide that 
members who have terminated their club memberships remain liable for unpaid
dues until their membership is sold.  The term "unpaid" is not defined in the 
documents. It is unclear whether the language relating to unpaid dues refers to 
unpaid dues owed at the time of resignation or unpaid dues accruing before and 
after resignation. 
Thus, we find the evidence relating to the issue of whether Appellants were 
obligated to pay dues post-resignation, viewed in the light most favorable to 
Appellants, leaves a genuine issue of material fact for trial and, thus, precludes 
judgment for Callawassie as a matter of law. 
Appellants further argue the circuit court failed to address language in the 
governing documents which provides that the liability for unpaid dues ends after 
four months of delinquency by the mandatory process of expulsion.  Appellants 
contend they had the right to be expelled from CIMC once their dues were 
delinquent for the four month period.  The 2001 GCRs provide: 
13.3.1.  Any member whose account is delinquent for 
sixty (60) days from the statement date may be 
suspended by the Board of Directors. . . . Any member 
whose account is not settled within the four (4) months'
period following suspension shall be expelled from the 
Club. 
Appellants presented evidence that prior to joining CIC they were assured by CIC 
employee Ellen Padgett3 that they would never be obligated to pay for more than 
four months of past dues. Ronnie Dennis testified Padgett informed him his 
"maximum liability was for four months," and Jeanette Dennis testified Padgett 
told her if Appellants wanted to leave the club they would only be responsible for 
four months of dues. Padgett testified in her deposition that she understood section 
13.3.1 to mean that after four months of delinquency, a member would lose his or 
her membership. 
We acknowledge that section 13.3.1 provides club members may be suspended; 
however, in light of the subsequent mandatory expulsion language and the 
3 Padgett remained on staff with CIC after it became CIMC.  She is referred to as 
the membership administrator, membership secretary, and membership coordinator 
throughout the record.   
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conflicting evidence presented as to the club's actual suspension and expulsion 
practices, we agree with Appellants that the language of the GCRs presented an 
ambiguity as to whether Appellants were entitled to expulsion and thus exposed to 
a maximum liability of four months' of unpaid dues (plus any accrued expenses).  
Where there is some ambiguity in the governing documents as to whether expelled 
members are still liable for dues accruing after expulsion, summary judgment is 
inappropriate. See Cafe Associates, Ltd. v. Gerngross, 305 S.C. 6, 9, 406 S.E.2d 
162, 164 (1991) ("As a general rule, written contracts are to be construed by the 
Court; but where a contract is ambiguous or capable of more than one construction, 
the question of what the parties intended becomes one of fact, and the question 
should be submitted to the jury.").   
II. The Nonprofit Corporations Act
Appellants argue the circuit court erred in failing to properly apply the Act.
Specifically, Appellants contend the circuit court erred in finding that assigning 
liability for continuing obligations post resignation is not statutorily prohibited 
under section 33-31-620 of the South Carolina Code (2006).   
Section 33-31-620 provides "(a) [a] member may resign at any time. (b) The 
resignation of a member does not relieve the member from any obligations the 
member may have to the corporation as a result of obligations incurred or 
commitments made before resignation."   
Section 33-31-620 obligates resigned members to pay any dues incurred before
resignation. This section does not require resigned members to continue to pay 
any dues that accrue after resignation. To do so, we believe, would create an 
unreasonable situation in which clubs could refuse to allow a member to ever 
terminate their membership obligations.  In essence, Appellants would be trapped 
like the proverbial guests in the Eagles' hit Hotel California, who are told "you can 
check-out anytime you like, but you can never leave."4 
Appellants state in their brief it is undisputed that CIMC membership is no longer 
available to non-Callawassie property holders.  With only 85 lots remaining for 
development and every fourth purchase coming off the resale list, it is possible 
only 21 names will ever come off the list.  Appellants are 72nd on the resale list.  
Therefore, it appears unlikely Appellants will ever be able to sell their 
4 Eagles, Hotel California, on Hotel California (Asylum 1977).   
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membership.  We find section 33-31-620 protects club members from such 
continuing liability after resignation. 
CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the circuit court's order granting summary judgment and
REMAND this case for trial.5 
WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
5 Based upon our reversal of the grant of summary judgment, the court need not 
address Appellants' remaining issues on appeal.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of 
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an 
appellate court need not address remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is 
dispositive). 
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HUFF, J.: Joshua William Porch appeals his conviction for murder, arguing the 
trial court erred in failing to void the State's arrest warrant pursuant to Franks v. 
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Delaware.1  Porch also argues the trial court erred by limiting Porch's testimony in 
violation of the Confrontation Clause.  We affirm. 
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In the early morning hours of May 13, 2006, Justin Mallory (Mallory) found his 
wife, Nikea Mallory (Victim), dead in the family's apartment in Richland County.  
Victim suffered blunt force trauma to the head, a bruise on her neck, a stab wound 
on the right side of her neck, and a stab wound on her right eyebrow.  The stab 
wound to Victim's neck was the fatal injury.  Hours after discovering Victim's
body, Mallory was charged with Victim's murder.   
During the murder investigation, Mallory told officers they should talk to Joshua 
Porch, who lived near Mallory. Investigator Randy Strange interviewed Porch and 
his wife. Porch told Investigator Strange he was not in the Victim's apartment the 
night of the murder. 
Police interviewed Porch again on June 27, 2007, after they discovered 
unidentified male DNA at the crime scene.  Porch agreed to provide officers with a 
DNA sample and told them that he was in the Victim's apartment the day before 
the murder. Porch stated he cut himself while he was peeling or cutting an apple 
for his child and he attempted to clean up the blood with paper towels in the 
kitchen. Porch then signed a written statement of his version of events.  In that 
statement, Porch also indicated he told this version of events to the investigators 
that interviewed him after the murder.   
Following the second interview, Major James Smith contacted Investigator Strange
to confirm Porch's story. Investigator Strange told Major Smith he could not recall 
Porch telling him he cut himself in the Victim's apartment the day before the 
murder. Major Smith returned to Porch's home that same day and asked Porch 
about his story. Porch told Major Smith he could not recall whether he told 
Investigator Strange about the cut.  Porch stated he was scared to tell the police 
about the cut because he did not want to be considered a suspect.   
1 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (allowing defendants to challenge a probable cause 
determination after the issuance of a search warrant in limited circumstances). 
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On July 2, 2007, Captain James White and Major Smith interviewed Porch again.  
Porch told the officers he was present at Victim's apartment during the early 
morning hours of May 13, 2006.  Porch stated he and Victim were drinking 
together that night and started kissing and fondling one another.  According to 
Porch, Mallory arrived at the apartment and became angry.  Mallory and Victim
started arguing in front of Porch but later went to the kitchen to continue arguing.  
Porch stated he saw Victim push Mallory and Mallory "swung at her" with an 
unidentified item in his hand.  Porch told the officers he stepped in between 
Mallory and the Victim to stop them from fighting and Mallory cut him.  Porch 
then went to the kitchen to wrap his hand with paper towels and clean up the blood.  
According to Porch, Victim was "slouched" on the couch when he left, but he did 
not think she was badly injured.  Porch explained he made inconsistent statements 
to police because he "was afraid [he] would be charged as an accomplice, or 
accused of actually doing it.  [He] was also afraid [his] wife would find out about 
[him] and [Victim] getting involved that morning."  During the interview, Captain
White noticed Porch was left handed.   
Mallory was tried twice for Victim's murder.  Porch testified consistent with his 
July 2, 2007 statement in each of those proceedings.  The first trial ended in a hung 
jury. Mallory then elected to proceed to a bench trial and was acquitted.  
Following his acquittal, Mallory contacted the Richland County Sheriff's 
Department (RCSD) and requested they reopen the investigation into his wife's
murder.  Deputy Chief David Wilson was assigned to investigate the case.  Chief 
Wilson reviewed the investigation file and noticed several inconsistencies.  Chief 
Wilson was bothered by Porch's shifting statements to police.  Chief Wilson noted 
the stab wounds were to the Victim's right side, which led him to suspect the 
assailant was left-handed.  Chief Wilson learned Porch was left-handed.  Finally, 
Chief Wilson reviewed DNA evidence from the crime scene, which revealed 
further inconsistencies relating to Porch's version of events.  Specifically, 
investigators found Porch's blood not only in the kitchen, but also on Victim's shirt.   
Chief Wilson interviewed several other witnesses and secured a warrant for Porch's
arrest. Officers learned Porch had moved from South Carolina back to his home 
town in California. On July 8, 2009, RCSD officers arrested Porch in a store in 
California and transported him to the Long Beach Police Department for 
questioning. Investigators Shawn McDaniel and Brian Godfrey notified Porch of 
his Miranda rights around 1:00 a.m. on July 9, 2009.  That morning, Porch 
admitted he stabbed Victim but claimed it was an accident.   
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Investigators McDaniel and Godfrey reviewed the case file to determine if the 
evidence supported Porch's accident claim.  The investigators then interviewed 
Porch again on July 10, 2009.  At that time, Porch told the investigators he initiated 
intimate contact with Victim and she attacked him with the knife.  Porch told 
officers he hit Victim in the head with his palms and once on the right side of her 
head with his left elbow. 
Investigators McDaniel and Godfrey then took Porch to the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff's Department for a third interview, which was recorded.  Initially, 
Investigator Cohen from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office interviewed 
Porch for six and a half hours.  Investigators McDaniel and Godfrey then
interviewed Porch. Subsequently, investigators brought Porch back to South 
Carolina for trial. 
Prior to trial, Porch challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support probable 
cause for his arrest warrant. Porch argued Chief Wilson intentionally or recklessly 
omitted information from his arrest warrant affidavit and any evidence gathered as 
a result of his arrest should be suppressed.  The trial court granted Porch a pretrial 
hearing to determine if the arrest warrant was valid but declined to suppress the 
evidence gathered as a result of Porch's arrest. 
Porch also made a motion in limine to exclude the entire recorded interrogation 
from California because Investigator Cohen was unavailable to testify.  Porch 
argued he would not be able to cross-examine her because the California state 
court declined to enforce the South Carolina subpoena sent by the State.  The trial 
court found Porch had an opportunity to cross-examine Investigator Cohen 
regarding the video at a pretrial Jackson v. Denno2 hearing. The trial court 
believed that opportunity to cross-examine was all that is necessary under 
Crawford v. Washington3 but took the matter under advisement.  The next 
morning, prior to trial, the court ruled the portion of the interview conducted by 
Investigator Cohen was inadmissible but the portion of the interview conducted by 
Investigators McDaniel and Godfrey was admissible.   
2 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
3 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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During the trial, Porch testified on his own behalf.  Prior to his testimony, Porch 
inquired whether he would be allowed to discuss what he was told in the six-and-a-
half-hour interview the court determined was not admissible because of 
Investigator Cohen's absence.  The State argued, "[I]f Mr. Porch testifies about 
specific occurrences within that six and a half hour interview with Investigator 
Cohen, . . . it opens the door for the possibility of us playing portions of that video 
as well." The trial court indicated it was troubled by Investigator Cohen's absence 
but agreed that Porch's testifying about Investigator Cohen's interview could 
potentially open the door for the video of the interview to be admitted into 
evidence. Porch decided not to testify about any statements from the recorded 
interview in order to ensure the State would not have an opportunity to rebut his 
testimony with the video.   
The jury found Porch guilty of Victim's murder.  The trial court sentenced Porch to 
fifty years' imprisonment.  This appeal followed. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Franks v. Delaware 
Porch argues the RCSD omitted critical exculpatory information from the arrest 
warrant. Porch asserts in light of the omitted information, no probable cause 
existed to support his arrest warrant.  Therefore, Porch requests this court void the 
arrest warrant and suppress any evidence resulting from Porch's arrest.   
"In Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments gave a defendant the right in certain circumstances to 
challenge the veracity of a warrant affidavit after the warrant had been issued and 
executed." State v. Missouri, 337 S.C. 548, 553, 524 S.E.2d 394, 396 (1999).  
Entitlement to a Franks hearing is a matter of law subject to de novo review.  
United States v. Tate, 524 F.3d 449, 455 (4th Cir. 2008).  The Franks test applies 
in cases when officers include false information in a warrant affidavit and cases 
when officers omit potentially exculpatory information. Missouri, 337 S.C. at 554, 
524 S.E.2d at 397. While we commend the trial court in this case for holding a 
Franks hearing out of an abundance of caution, we find Porch failed to overcome 
his heavy burden to establish he was entitled to such a hearing.  Furthermore, we 
take this opportunity to clarify the proper standard trial courts should apply in 
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cases in which the defendant challenges the omission of evidence from the arrest 
affidavit. 
"To be entitled to a Franks hearing for an alleged omission, the challenger must 
make a preliminary showing that the information in question was omitted with the 
intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether it made, the affidavit misleading 
to the issuing judge."  Id.  "There will be no Franks violation if the affidavit, 
including the omitted data, still contains sufficient information to establish 
probable cause." Id. (emphasis added).   
The defendant has the burden of proving the officer acted with the requisite intent.  
State v. Gore, 408 S.C. 237, 244, 758 S.E.2d 717, 721 (Ct. App. 2014).  "A party 
attempting to demonstrate information was intentionally or recklessly omitted from
an affidavit bears a heavy burden of proof." State v. Lynch, 412 S.C. 156, 179, 771 
S.E.2d 346, 358 (Ct. App. 2015). "The defendant must also show that the omitted 
material was necessary to the finding of probable cause, i.e., that the omitted 
material was such that its inclusion in the affidavit would defeat probable cause."  
Id. at 180, 771 S.E.2d at 358-59 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 
Shorter, 328 F.3d 167, 170 (4th Cir. 2003)).  "Upon making this two-part 
preliminary showing, a defendant is entitled to a hearing, at which he bears the 
burden of proving the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence."  Id. at 180, 
771 S.E.2d at 359 (quoting Shorter, 328 F.3d at 170). "If a Franks hearing is 
appropriate and an affiant's material perjury or recklessness is established by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the warrant 'must be voided' and evidence or 
testimony gathered pursuant to it must be excluded."  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
"The mere fact that the affiant did not list every conceivable conclusion does not 
taint the validity of the affidavit." Colkley, 899 F.2d at 301 (quoting United States 
v. Burnes, 816 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1987)).  "'[M]ere[] neligen[ce] in . . . 
recording the facts relevant to a probable cause determination' is not enough."  Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 170). An omission does not 
per se invalidate the arrest warrant. Gore, 408 S.C. at 245, 758 S.E.2d at 721.  The 
Fourth Circuit has expressed "doubts about the validity of inferring bad motive 
under Franks from the fact of omission alone, for such an inference collapses into 
a single inquiry the two elements–'intentionality' and 'materiality'–which Franks
states are independently necessary."  Colkley, 899 F.2d at 301. 
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"Probable cause is a 'commonsense, nontechnical conception [ ] that deal[s] with 
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'"  State v. Morris, 411 S.C. 571, 580, 769 
S.E.2d 854, 859 (2015) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 
(1996)). 
Porch asserted Franks requires the trial court excise any offending information 
from an arrest warrant affidavit, then analyze the affidavit to determine if probable
cause still exists to support the warrant.  However, Porch conflates the test for the 
inclusion of false information in a warrant affidavit with the test for omission of 
potentially exculpatory information.  If a defendant carries his heavy burden of 
demonstrating information was intentionally or recklessly omitted from the 
affidavit, the trial court must then include the potentially exculpatory information 
and determine if probable cause exists.   
We find Porch failed to overcome his burden to show Chief Wilson intentionally or 
recklessly omitted potentially exculpatory information from his warrant affidavit.   
In the affidavit, Chief Wilson stated: 
That on 05/14/2006 while at 1103 Pinelane Rd. Apt. 
331C in the Dentsville Magisterial District of Richland 
County, one Joshua Porch did commit the crime of 
Murder in that he did with malice and aforethought 
assault and stab Nakia Mallory in the neck which resulted 
in the death of Nakia Mallory. The defendant has 
admitted to being at the scene of the crime during the 
assault and stabbing and has been further implicated in 
the crime by DNA testing of blood found at the scene 
that puts the defendant at the scene and implicates the 
defendant in the assault at the time of the murder.   
Chief Wilson stated he faxed the warrant to Judge Phil Newsom and personally 
appeared before the magistrate to discuss the case.  Neither Chief Wilson nor 
Judge Newsom remembered the specific details they discussed prior to Judge 
Newsom signing the warrant.  Judge Newsom agreed with Chief Wilson probable 
cause existed to believe Porch committed the murder and authorized the arrest 
warrant. 
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Judge Newsom also testified he never signs a warrant before the officer requesting 
the warrant physically appears before him.  Judge Newsom was "sure" Chief 
Wilson told him some background on this case, but he could not recall anything in
particular and he stated warrant proceedings are not recorded. Finally, Judge 
Newsom stated he did not remember Chief Wilson telling him Porch admitted 
being at the crime scene because Porch witnessed the Victim's husband stab her.  
During the pretrial hearing, Chief Wilson testified he did not include some 
information in the affidavit. Specifically, Wilson admitted he did not include (1) 
information from an eye witness from the first two trials who testified she heard a 
"domestic argument" coming from the apartment and saw a black male running 
toward a white van; (2) information from a security guard at the hospital Mallory 
took Victim to who testified he heard Mallory say, "Bitch bled all over my van, my 
walls, my Playstation" and saw Mallory remove something from his van while it 
was at the hospital; (3) Mallory had "plenty of time" to commit this murder; (4) 
Porch's statements regarding how his blood came to be at the scene of the crime; 
(5) information that Mallory had been tried twice for this crime and Porch testified 
for the State in both instances; and (6) information that the situation during the 
argument was "fluid" and the blood could have gotten on Victim's shirt during her 
fight with Mallory.  However, Chief Wilson testified none of the information he 
included in the affidavit was false, and he believed the totality of the circumstances
established probable cause to arrest Porch for Victim's murder.
Chief Wilson admitted he omitted some information from the warrant affidavit, but 
we find the content of the omissions alone is insufficient evidence to demonstrate 
Chief Wilson acted intentionally or with reckless disregard of whether the 
omissions would make the affidavit misleading.  There is no evidence Chief 
Wilson intentionally omitted the statements regarding Mallory's involvement in his 
wife's death. Furthermore, including the statements from all four versions of 
Porch's story was unnecessary because those statements were not credible.  
Accordingly, we find Porch failed to make a sufficient showing to entitle him to a 
Franks hearing. 
While we find Porch failed to demonstrate Chief Wilson intentionally or recklessly 
omitted potentially exculpatory information, we also find, even including the 
potentially exculpatory information, the affidavit was still sufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause to secure an arrest warrant for Porch.  Porch admitted he 
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was present at the murder scene and his blood was found in the same area where 
Victim's body was found.   
Although Porch testified for the State in Mallory's murder trial, his story continued 
to change throughout the investigation.  If all of this information were included in 
the affidavit presented to the magistrate, we find probable cause would have 
supported an arrest warrant for Porch.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
decision not to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of Porch's arrest. 
II. Confrontation Clause 
Porch argues the trial court erred by "threatening Porch with the introduction of a 
videotape displaying [Porch's] interrogation" in violation of the Confrontation 
Clause. Porch also asserts the trial court's decision to allow the State to rebut his 
testimony using the video limited his ability to present a full and complete 
defense.4 
"As a general rule, if an issue was not raised and ruled upon below, it will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal." State v. Santiago, 370 S.C. 153, 163, 634 
S.E.2d 23, 28 (Ct. App. 2006). "[A] proffer of testimony is required to preserve 
the issue of whether the testimony was properly excluded by the trial [court], and 
an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony 
unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have 
been." Id. at 163, 634 S.E.2d at 29. 
We find this issue is not preserved for this court's review.  The trial court indicated 
the State may have been able to rebut Porch's testimony by introducing the video if 
Porch opened the door by testifying about the California interrogation.  However, 
Porch failed to proffer what his testimony would have been if he were allowed to 
testify about the interrogation without opening the door.  Therefore, we decline to 
address Porch's Confrontation Clause argument. 
4 Porch also argues the trial court erred in finding he had an opportunity to cross-
examine Investigator Cohen during the Jackson v. Denno hearing. However, 
Porch admits the State only submitted that portion of the interview conducted by 
Investigators McDaniels and Godfrey.  Because the State did not seek to admit any 
portion of the interview conducted by Investigator Cohen, we find this argument is 
without merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Porch's conviction is  
AFFIRMED. 

KONDUROS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 
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LOCKEMY, C.J.: The Town of Awendaw (the Town) appeals the circuit court's 
final order, arguing the court erred in finding (1) Lynne Vicary, Kent Prause, and 
the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League had standing; (2) the Town never 
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received a proper petition requesting the 2004 annexation; (3) the Town falsely 
claimed it had a proper petition to annex the United States Forest Service (the 
Forest Service) property; (4) the Town was estopped from asserting a statute of 
limitations defense; and (5) the statutory time period for challenging the 2004 
annexation was tolled. We reverse.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Beginning in 2004, the Town made a series of three land annexations, starting with 
the annexation of a strip of the Francis Marion National Forest (the National 
Forest) and culminating in October 2009 with the annexation of a 359.51-acre tract 
(the Nebo Tract). The Nebo Tract is encircled by the National Forest and is owned 
by EBC, LLC. 
The Town attempted to create the required contiguity between its own border and 
the Nebo Tract by annexing the ten-foot wide and 1.25 mile long strip of the 
National Forest (the Ten-Foot Strip).  The Ten-Foot Strip is contiguous with the 
Nebo Church Tract1, which connects the Nebo Tract to the Ten-Foot Strip.  
The Town annexed the three tracts (Nebo Tract, Nebo Church Tract, and Ten-Foot 
Strip) purportedly using the 100% petition method outlined in section 5-3-150(3) 
of the South Carolina Code (2004).2  In early 2004, the Town requested the Forest 
Service enable the Town to annex the Ten-Foot Strip in order for the Town to also 
annex the Nebo Church Tract.  Despite the Town's admission that the Forest 
Service did not provide them anything in writing expressing their desire that the 
Ten-Foot Strip be annexed, the Town used a 1994 letter it received from a Forest 
Service representative stating the agency had "no objection" to the annexation of 
several strips of property described therein.  According to land surveyor Robert 
Frank, none of the strips described in the 1994 letter were the Ten-Foot Strip at 
issue in this case.   
1 The Nebo Church Tract is owned by Mount Nebo AME Church.   
2 Pursuant to section 5-3-150(3), "any area or property which is contiguous to a 
municipality may be annexed to the municipality by filing with the municipal 
governing body a petition signed by all persons owning real estate in the area 
requesting annexation." 
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On May 10, 2004, the Town passed an ordinance stating a "proper petition h[ad]
been filed" for annexation of the Ten-Foot Strip and accepting the petition.  The 
Town also passed an ordinance that same day annexing the Nebo Church Tract. 
In 2009, EBC requested the Town annex the Nebo Tract under the 100% petition 
method. On October 1, 2009, the Town passed an ordinance accepting the petition 
and annexing the Nebo Tract. The Town also enacted ordinances (1) rezoning the 
Nebo Tract as "planned development," (2) declaring its Comprehensive Plan 
amended to allow the Nebo Tract as planned development, and (3) approving a 
development agreement with EBC. 
On April 23, 2010, Lynne Vicary, Kent Prause, and the South Carolina Coastal 
Conservation League (collectively, Respondents)3 filed a second amended 
complaint against the Town and EBC.  Respondents alleged that by unlawfully 
annexing the Nebo Tract and allowing for intensive residential and commercial 
development of the property, the Town has harmed and "will continue to harm one 
of the most important ecological areas on the Atlantic coast, including the 
[National Forest], a sensitive resource of national significance that is owned and 
managed for the benefit of the public."  Respondents asserted the Town's 2004 
annexation of the Ten-Foot Strip was void because the Town never received a 
petition requesting annexation from the Forest Service, and therefore, the 
subsequent annexations of the Nebo Tract and the Nebo Church Tract failed 
because those tracts lacked contiguity with the Town.  Respondents requested the 
court declare the Nebo Tract annexation ordinance void and issue a declaratory 
judgment "adjudicating the invalidity of the annexation and all accompanying 
ordinances regarding the Nebo Tract, including the ordinance approving the 
Development Agreement, the amendment of the Comprehensive Plan, and the 
purported rezoning, and a permanent injunction enjoining acts in furtherance of 
any of the illegally enacted ordinances and requiring that the Nebo Tract be 
returned to the status quo prior to the illegal annexation and rezoning . . . ."   
On December 22, 2010, the Town and EBC filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment arguing Respondents lacked standing and their challenge was barred by 
the statute of limitations.  The circuit court subsequently denied the motion.  On 
September 6, 2012, Respondents and EBC entered into a settlement agreement 
wherein EBC dismissed its counterclaims against Respondents and Respondents 
dismissed their claims against EBC.  
3  Vicary and Prause are residents of the Town.  The League has members who are 
residents of the Town. 
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The case proceeded to trial on April 16, 2014.  Following trial, the circuit court 
issued an order declaring (1) Respondents had standing; (2) the action was timely 
filed; and (3) the Town's annexation of the Ten-Foot Strip was void because the
Town never received a petition of annexation from the Forest Service.  The court 
declared "[b]ecause the annexation of the Ten-Foot Strip was ultra vires of the 
Town's authority, the Town's subsequent annexations of the Nebo Church Tract 
and the Nebo Tract fail because these tracts lack contiguity with the Town."  The
court further held 
because the Nebo Tract did not occur as a matter of law, 
it follows that the other ordinances enacted by the Town 
on October 1, 2009 to (1) approve a development 
agreement for the Nebo Tract, (2) amend the Town's 
Comprehensive Plan to include the agreed-upon 
development, and (3) rezone the Nebo Tract are each 
ultra vires and void ab initio. 
Thereafter, the Town filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to reconsider.  The circuit 
court denied the Town's motion on September 22, 2014.  The Town appealed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Declaratory judgments in and of themselves are neither legal nor equitable."  
Campbell v. Marion Cty. Hosp. Dist., 354 S.C. 274, 279, 580 S.E.2d 163, 165 (Ct. 
App. 2003). "The standard of review for a declaratory judgment action is therefore 
determined by the nature of the underlying issue."  Id.
The present case is an action in equity. See Sloan v. Greenville Cty., 356 S.C. 531, 
544, 590 S.E.2d 338, 345-46 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding a declaratory judgment 
action brought by a taxpayer citizen requesting declaratory relief is an action in 
equity). In an appeal from an action in equity tried by a judge, an appellate court 
may find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the 
evidence. Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 
773, 775-76 (1976). "While this standard permits a broad scope of review, an 
appellate court will not disregard the findings of the [circuit] court, which saw and 
heard the witnesses and was in a better position to evaluate their credibility."  
Buffington v. T.O.E. Enters., 383 S.C. 388, 391, 680 S.E.2d 289, 290 (2009).
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LAW/ANALYSIS 
The Town argues the circuit court erred in finding Respondents had standing to 
challenge the 2004 annexation ordinance.  We agree. 
"To have standing, one must have a personal stake in the subject matter of the 
lawsuit." Sloan v. Greenville Cty., 356 S.C. at 547, 590 S.E.2d at 347 (quoting Sea 
Pines Ass'n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S. C. Dep't of Nat. Res., 345 S.C. 594, 600, 
550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001)). "Standing may be acquired: (1) by statute; (2) 
through the rubric of 'constitutional standing'; or (3) under the 'public importance'
exception." ATC S., Inc. v. Charleston Cty., 380 S.C. 191, 195, 669 S.E.2d 337, 
339 (2008). 
The circuit court determined Respondents had standing under the public 
importance exception and as taxpayers challenging government action under the 
South Carolina Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act4. On appeal, the Town argues 
Respondents did not have statutory standing.  Citing to St. Andrews Pub. Serv. 
Dist. v. City Council of City of Charleston, 349 S.C. 602, 564 S.E.2d 647 (2002) 
and Ex parte State ex rel. Wilson v Town of Yemassee, 391 S.C. 565, 707 S.E.2d 
402 (2011), the Town asserts the only non-statutory party which may challenge a 
municipal annexation is the State of South Carolina acting in the public interest to 
challenge an absolutely void annexation ordinance.  The Town further contends 
Respondents lacked constitutional standing and the public importance exception is 
not applicable. 
On appeal, Respondents argue they had standing under the public importance 
exception and as taxpayers challenging government action under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-30 (2005) ("Any person . . . whose 
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, 
contract or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity 
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."); see also Sloan v. 
Greenville Cty., 356 S.C. at 551, 590 S.E.2d at 349 (holding taxpaying citizen of 
Greenville County had a direct interest in the County abiding by procurement 
procedures set out in the County code); Sloan v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 342 
S.C. 515, 520, 537 S.E.2d 299, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding taxpayer in Greenville 
County had standing to sue as an individual taxpayer who had interest in the proper 
use and allocation of tax receipts by the school district and holding "[a] taxpayer's 
4 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (2005). 
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standing to challenge unauthorized or illegal governmental acts has been 
repeatedly recognized in South Carolina" and taxpayers in the past have been held 
to "constitute a class specially damaged" by illegal, ultra vires acts).  Respondents 
argue St. Andrews and Yemassee are distinguishable from the present case because 
they involved annexations municipalities attempted to carry out in good faith, not 
through deceitful conduct.  
We agree with the Town that Respondents lacked standing.  Our case law provides 
that "to challenge a 100% annexation, the challenger must assert an infringement 
of its own proprietary interests or statutory rights," and the State of South Carolina 
is the only non-statutory party which may challenge a municipal annexation.  See 
St. Andrews, 349 S.C. at 604-05, 564 S.E.2d at 648. 
In St. Andrews, the supreme court granted certiorari to consider whether municipal 
annexations using roadways to achieve contiguity are authorized by statute.  349 
S.C. at 603, 564 S.E.2d at 647. In deciding this issue, the court articulated the 
general rule of standing for annexation challenges.  Id. at 604, 564 S.E.2d at 648; 
see also S.C. Code Ann §§ 5-3-150(1), (3) (2004).  The court explained the rules 
for standing vary depending on whether the method of annexation is carried out via 
the 75% or 100% method. St. Andrews, 349 S.C. at 604, 564 S.E.2d at 648.  Under 
the 75% method, the challenger must be a municipality or one of its residents, or 
reside or own property in the annexed area; while under the 100% method, the 
challenger must assert an infringement of its own proprietary interests or statutory 
rights.  Id. In addition, the supreme court held, "the only non-statutory party which 
may challenge a municipal annexation is the State, through a quo warranto action."  
Id. at 605, 564 S.E.2d at 648 (emphasis omitted).  The court found "the better 
policy is to limit 'outsider' annexation challenges to those brought by the State 
'acting in the public interest.'" Id.
In Yemassee, the supreme court applied the general standing rule for 100% 
annexations as articulated in St. Andrews. 391 S.C. at 572, 707 S.E.2d at 406.  The 
Yemassee case involved tracts of land annexed via the 100% petition method in 
which the plaintiffs argued the municipality failed to comply with the signature 
requirements of the 100% method. 391 S.C. at 573, 707 S.E.2d at 406.  
Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted the annexation should have been treated as 
made by the 75% method, as opposed to the 100% method, since the annexed 
lands included state-owned marshlands in addition to privately-held properties.  Id.
In denying standing to the plaintiffs, the supreme court reaffirmed its ruling from
St. Andrews that to challenge a 100% annexation, the challenger must assert an 
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infringement of its own proprietary interests or statutory rights.  Id. at 572-74, 707 
S.E.2d at 406-07.
Here, Respondents have failed to show any infringement of their own proprietary 
interests or statutory rights.  In addition, because none of Respondents are the State 
of South Carolina, they are prohibited from challenging the Town's annexations 
pursuant to St. Andrews and Yemassee. Respondents contend St. Andrews and 
Yemassee are distinguishable from the present case because those cases involved 
annexations carried out in good faith, not through deception.  We disagree and note 
Respondents failed to cite any case law to support this argument.  Additionally, 
although Respondents contend they met the standard for the public importance 
exception for standing, St. Andrews clearly provides the State, acting in the public 
interest, is the only non-statutory party which may challenge a municipal 
annexation. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the circuit court's determination that Respondents had standing.  In 
light of our disposition of the case, it is not necessary to address the Town's
remaining issues.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address 
remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive). 
REVERSED. 
WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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WILLIAMS, J.:  The estate of Philip J. Brust1 appeals the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of First South Bank (First South) as well as its denial 
of Brust's motion to amend his answer and counterclaim.  Brust argues the court 
erred in (1) granting First South's motion for summary judgment because it ignored 
questions of fact regarding the scope of authority granted under a specific limited 
power of attorney (the POA), Brust's knowledge of a guaranty's scope, the effect of 
subsequent loan modifications, and Brust's proposed counterclaims against First 
South; and (2) denying Brust's motion to amend because it incorrectly relied upon 
the doctrine of res judicata rather than deciding the motion under Rule 15, SCRCP.  
We affirm as modified. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This appeal arises from a loan (the Loan) between First South and Ecological 
Investments, LLC (Ecological), for which First South obtained separate personal 
guaranties from Brust (the Guaranty) and John Rosenberg.  Brust and Rosenberg 
were both members of Ecological.  In 2005, Ecological owned 82.68 acres in 
Jasper County (the Property), an area that Ecological intended to convert into a 
"Butterfly Kingdom" for the conservation of butterflies.  Prior to becoming 
involved with First South, Ecological obtained a loan from a separate bank in 
2001.2  First South offered to refinance Ecological's existing loan in 2005, 
providing a $2.6 million interest-only loan with a two-year term. 
On January 9, 2006, First South issued a letter (the Commitment Letter) to 
Rosenberg and Brust, explaining First South was "pleased to commit to
Ecological . . . a loan commitment."  The Commitment Letter set forth pertinent 
information related to liabilities and the Loan, including that "[p]ayment of the 
Loan shall be unconditionally guaranteed, jointly and severally by [Rosenberg and 
Brust]." The Commitment Letter further stated that, upon its acceptance, it "shall 
1 Philip J. Brust died during the pendency of the underlying action, and his estate 
was substituted as a party to the action.  For the purposes of this opinion, we refer
to Brust and his estate simply as "Brust." 
2 According to Terry Finger, Brust's attorney, Brust executed a power of attorney 
in 2001, granting Finger the authority to act as Brust's attorney-in-fact and 
authorizing Finger to execute a guaranty. 
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become an integral part of the Loan documents."  Rosenberg and Brust signed the 
Commitment Letter in their individual capacities.  
Brust executed the POA on January 25, 2006, appointing Finger or Rosenberg as 
his true and lawful attorney and granting Finger and Rosenberg the authority 
to execute any and all documents, and to perform any 
lawful act or to execute or amend any document, 
instrument, or thing, which may be involved in the 
financing of [the Property], including, but not necessarily 
limited to, the power to execute . . . any document, 
instrument, contract, [n]ote, [m]ortgage, agreement, 
assignment, affidavit, disclosure, etc[etera] . . . or to 
execute any such other documents as may be necessary to 
close the [L]oan with First South Bank in the original 
principal sum of $2,600,000.00. 
First South and Ecological closed the Loan on February 2, 2006.  At the closing, 
Rosenberg executed his personal guaranty as well as the Guaranty, signing as 
Brust's attorney-in-fact.3  The Guaranty, executed to induce First South to make 
loans to Ecological, stated the following: 
[Brust] absolutely and unconditionally guarantees [First 
South] the full and prompt payment when due . . . of the 
debts, liabilities[,] and obligations as follows: 
. . . . 
[Brust] guarantees to [First South] the payment and 
performance of each and every debt, liability[,] and 
obligation of every type and description [that Ecological] 
may now or at any time hereafter owe to [First South] 
(whether . . . now exist[ing] or . . . hereafter created or 
incurred . . . ). 
3 Although Brust did not attend the closing, First South was unaware of his absence 
until after receipt of the closing documents.  Additionally, no First South 
representative attended the closing. 
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. . . . 
The liability of [Brust] shall not be affected or impaired 
by . . . any one or more extensions or renewals of 
[i]ndebtedness (whether . . . for longer than the original 
period) or any modification of the interest rates, 
maturities[,] or other contractual terms applicable to any 
[i]ndebtedness . . . . 
Ecological defaulted under the Loan on November 30, 2012.  On March 8, 2013, 
First South filed a summons and complaint against Rosenberg and Brust, claiming 
the guaranties induced it into making the Loan, and Rosenberg and Brust were in 
default under their respective guaranties.  First South requested judgment against 
Brust and Rosenberg for the remaining amount due under the terms of the Loan.4 
Brust filed an answer to the complaint and asserted, in pertinent part, the following 
affirmative defenses: 
20. [First South's] claim is barred, in whole or in part, 
because [its] alleged losses are the result of [its] failure to
follow its own policies and procedures and negligence in 
the underwriting, approval[,] and administration of the 
[L]oan . . . . 
. . . . 
23. [Defendant] Brust should be released from any 
obligations under the Guaranty . . . to the extent [First 
South] breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing to 
. . . Brust and to the extent [First South] had knowledge 
or should have known that . . . Brust was being deceived 
by . . . Rosenberg regarding the [L]oan and collateral or 
that . . . Brust had been induced to enter into the 
4 Rosenberg consented to summary judgment against him on October 2, 2013.  
Accordingly, Rosenberg was not involved in the matter after this date and is not a 
party to this appeal. 
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Guaranty in ignorance of facts that materially increased 
his risks under the Guaranty. 
Thereafter, First South filed a motion for summary judgment as to Brust on all 
claims.  Brust filed a memorandum in opposition to First South's motion, claiming 
(1) no apparent or implied authority existed because First South did not rely upon 
the POA, and (2) no ratification occurred because Brust had no knowledge of the 
Guaranty's terms and never affirmatively acted to accept the Guaranty. 
Brust later deposed Finger and Patrick Wright, First South's vice president, who 
stated it was unnecessary for the Guaranty to cover "continuing" and "unlimited" 
debts, liabilities, and obligations.  Additionally, Wright stated he did not attend the 
closing or review the Guaranty prior to the closing. 
Subsequently, Brust filed a motion to amend his answer pursuant to Rule 15(a), 
SCRCP, claiming the amendments neither raised novel legal issues nor prejudiced 
First South. With the motion, Brust attached his proposed amended answer, in 
which he sought to assert the following counterclaims against First South: 
90. First South breached [its duty to act reasonably and 
comply with standard banking practices] by failing to 
adhere to its own policies and procedures, and failing to 
comply with the standard banking practices for the 
underwriting, closing[,] and administration of the loans in 
question. 
. . . . 
95. First South has breach[ed] any contractual 
obligations that exist pursuant to the Guaranty or 
otherwise by failing to adhere to the specific contractual 
obligations set forth in the Guaranty and for breaching 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . .  
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Four days after Brust filed his motion to amend, the circuit court held a hearing on 
First South's motion for summary judgment.5  At the hearing, First South 
contended the POA was unambiguous, Rosenberg had the authority to bind Brust 
under the Guaranty, and Brust was responsible for the debt.  Brust asserted the 
following arguments in response:  Rosenberg did not have actual authority to bind 
Brust under the Guaranty because the Guaranty's terms exceeded the scope 
permitted by the POA, and the POA was required to specifically grant authority to 
execute a Guaranty; no apparent authority existed because First South did not rely 
upon the POA; the Guaranty unconditionally guaranteed any future debts, which 
was not permitted by the POA; First South did not know of the POA's existence or 
that Rosenberg signed the Guaranty on behalf of Brust until after the closing, 
showing it did not rely upon the POA; any reliance by First South was 
unreasonable because it failed to follow standard banking procedures in 
determining Rosenberg's authority; and material modifications and "changes" to 
the Loan released Brust from liability under the Guaranty.   
According to Brust, most of these issues involved questions of fact that should not 
be determined at the summary judgment stage.  Brust also stated, "[W]e did raise 
affirmative defenses . . . [a]nd so we decided to re-style it as a 
counterclaim . . . . So all of those allegations were pled . . . [, and w]e intend to re-
style them as counterclaims as soon as the court can hear us on th[e motion to 
amend]."  The circuit court took the matter under advisement. 
The circuit court subsequently issued an order granting First South's motion for 
summary judgment.  The court found, inter alia, Brust's proposed counterclaims
were identical to two of his original defenses, the POA vested in Rosenberg the 
authority to sign the Guaranty on Brust's behalf, and Ecological defaulted under the 
Loan. The court concluded (1) the POA was clear and unambiguous and granted 
Rosenberg actual authority to sign the Guaranty on Brust's behalf, (2) Rosenberg 
had apparent authority to bind Brust under the Guaranty, (3) First South relied 
upon Brust's representations when it closed the loan, (4) Brust ratified the Guaranty 
by enjoying the Loan's benefits and not repudiating the Guaranty, (5) First South 
5 Brust did not object to the circuit court ruling upon the motion for summary 
judgment prior to hearing arguments on the motion to amend.  Instead, Brust 
agreed that the summary judgment motion was the only matter before the court at
this hearing. 
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breached no duty, (6) no renewal or modification released Brust from liability 
under the Guaranty, and (7) the proposed counterclaims "contain[ed] the same 
material allegations as the defenses set forth in the [original answer] . . . and shall 
be treated as the defenses contained in the [original a]nswer and disposed of." 
 
Thereafter, the circuit court held a hearing on Brust's motion to amend.  Brust then 
filed a motion to alter or amend the order granting summary judgment, alleging a 
multitude of errors in the court's order.  The court issued an order denying the 
motion to amend, ruling the counterclaims "would prejudice [First South] and 
force [it] to re-litigate matters barred by res judicata."  One week later, the court 
denied Brust's motion to alter or amend the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
First South. This appeal followed.   
 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
I. Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment in favor of First 
South? 
 
II. Did the circuit court err in designating Brust's proposed counterclaims as 
defenses? 
 
III. Did the circuit court err in denying Brust's motion to amend? 
 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
 
I. Grant of Summary Judgment 
 
First, Brust argues the circuit court erred in finding no genuine issue of material 
fact existed as to the scope of the POA and Brust's liability under the Guaranty.  
We disagree. 
 
"When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, appellate courts apply the same 
standard applied by the [circuit] court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP."  Turner v. 
Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 121–22, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011).  Rule 56(c), SCRCP, 
provides summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show . . . no genuine issue [exists] as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  "In ruling on a 
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motion for summary judgment, the evidence and the inferences which can be 
drawn therefrom should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Harrington v. Mikell, 321 S.C. 518, 521, 469 S.E.2d 627, 629 (Ct. App. 
1996). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of clearly 
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Singleton v. Sherer, 
377 S.C. 185, 197, 659 S.E.2d 196, 202 (Ct. App. 2008).  Once the moving party 
meets this burden, "the opponent cannot simply rest on mere allegations or denials 
contained in the pleadings," but rather "must come forward with specific facts 
showing . . . a genuine issue for trial."  Id. at 197–98, 659 S.E.2d at 203. 
A. Rosenberg's Actual Authority 
Brust argues the circuit court misinterpreted the POA by refusing to recognize it 
was susceptible to more than one interpretation.  According to Brust, other 
jurisdictions have been "especially cautious" in recognizing an agent's ability to 
bind a principal under a guaranty, and this court should adopt the position that the 
authority to bind under a guaranty must be expressly granted in the power of 
attorney. Brust further insists the POA's language was ambiguous as to whether 
Rosenberg had actual authority to bind Brust to the Guaranty.6  We disagree. 
"A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person, as principal,
appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the authority to perform certain 
specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf of the principal."  Watson v. Underwood, 
407 S.C. 443, 454, 756 S.E.2d 155, 161 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting In re Thames, 
344 S.C. 564, 569, 544 S.E.2d 854, 856 (Ct. App. 2001)).  This court has 
previously concluded that "an action to interpret a power of attorney is similar to 
an action to interpret a contract" and, thus, "is an action at law."  Id.
"The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the 
intention of the parties and, in determining that intention, the court looks to the 
language of the contract." Id. at 454–55, 756 S.E.2d at 161 (quoting Sphere Drake 
Ins. Co. v. Litchfield, 313 S.C. 471, 473, 438 S.E.2d 275, 277 (Ct. App. 1993)).  
Although the construction of an ambiguous contract is a question of fact, the 
6 In arguing the POA was ambiguous, Brust analyzes facts beyond the POA's four 
corners, explaining the 2001 power of attorney specifically stated "guaranty," but 
the POA did not; the same attorney drafted both powers of attorney; and according 
to Wright's deposition, the Guaranty was not necessary to the closing of the Loan. 
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interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law.  Bennett & Bennett 
Constr., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 405 S.C. 1, 4, 747 S.E.2d 426, 427 (2013). 
This court is "without authority to alter an unambiguous contract by construction 
or to make new contracts for the parties." S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. M & T Enters. 
of Mt. Pleasant, LLC, 379 S.C. 645, 655, 667 S.E.2d 7, 13 (Ct. App. 2008).   
 
Moreover, "[i]f a contract is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to 
give the contract a meaning different from that indicated by its plain terms."  Bates 
v. Lewis, 311 S.C. 158, 161 n.1, 427 S.E.2d 907, 909 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993).  
"Whe[n] the contract's language is clear and unambiguous, the language alone 
determines the contract's force and effect."  Whitlock v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 
399 S.C. 610, 615, 732 S.E.2d 626, 628 (2012) (quoting McGill v. Moore, 381 S.C. 
179, 185, 672 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2009)).  "A contract is read as a whole document 
so that one may not create an ambiguity by pointing out a single sentence or 
clause." McGill, 381 S.C. at 185, 672 S.E.2d at 574.  This court's duty is to 
enforce the contract made by the parties regardless of the parties' failure to 
carefully guard their rights.  Watson, 407 S.C. at 455, 756 S.E.2d at 162. 
 
In the instant case, the circuit court found the POA was unambiguous and 
permitted Rosenberg to execute the Guaranty on behalf of Brust.  We hold Brust 
failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the POA's ambiguity 
and, therefore, reject Brust's argument that Rosenberg had no actual authority.  In 
determining Brust and Rosenberg's intent, we find the POA's language 
unambiguously granted Rosenberg the authority "to execute any and all 
documents . . . or to execute or amend any document, instrument, or thing, which 
may be involved in the financing of [the Property]."  See Watson, 407 S.C. at 454– 
55, 765 S.E.2d at 161 ("The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intention of the parties and, in determining that intention, the 
court looks to the language of the contract." (quoting Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 313 
S.C. at 473, 438 S.E.2d at 277)). 
 
Although Brust contends the POA was ambiguous, we note the only possible 
ambiguity in it was the language "as may be necessary to close the [L]oan."  
However, even if we construed the term "necessary"—or the entire phrase—as 
ambiguous, this single term or phrase did not render the POA ambiguous.  Other 
language in the POA clearly permitted Rosenberg "to execute 
any . . . documents . . . involved in [the Property's] financing."  See McGill, 381 
S.C. at 185, 672 S.E.2d at 574 ("A contract is read as a whole document so that one 
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may not create an ambiguity by pointing out a single sentence or clause.").  
Further, the POA did not limit Rosenberg's authority to execute documents 
necessary to close the Loan.  Instead, the POA permitted the execution of any 
documents related to the Property's financing.  Thus, we do not look beyond the 
POA to determine the parties' intent.  See Whitlock, 399 S.C. at 615, 732 S.E.2d at 
628 ("Whe[n] the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, 
that language alone determines the instrument's force and effect." (quoting McGill, 
381 S.C. at 185, 672 S.E.2d at 574)). 
Given our finding that the POA was unambiguous, we reject Brust's invitation to 
go beyond the four corners of the POA in construing the document.  See Bates, 311
S.C. at 161 n.1, 427 S.E.2d at 909 n.1 (noting extrinsic evidence cannot be used to 
give an unambiguous contract a meaning different from the meaning indicated by 
its plain terms).  Moreover, we reject Brust's contention that an agent cannot sign a 
guaranty on behalf of his principal pursuant to a power of attorney unless the 
power of attorney specifically authorized the execution because this assertion is 
unsupported by South Carolina law.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment as to this issue because Rosenberg possessed actual 
authority to bind Brust to the Guaranty's terms.7 
B. Modifications Resulting in Release from Liability 
Brust further contends the circuit court erred in finding subsequent modifications 
did not release him from liability under the Guaranty.  According to Brust, material 
changes to the Loan and First South's failure to communicate these changes—in 
violation of its banking policies—released Brust from liability under the Guaranty.  
We disagree. 
"A guaranty is a contract." CoastalStates Bank v. Hanover Homes of S.C., LLC, 
408 S.C. 510, 518, 759 S.E.2d 152, 157 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting TranSouth Fin. 
Corp. v. Cochran, 324 S.C. 290, 294, 478 S.E.2d 63, 65 (Ct. App. 1996)).  As
7 Because our holding on the issue of actual authority is dispositive, we need not 
reach the issues of apparent authority and ratification.  See Futch v. McAllister 
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) 
(ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when the 
disposition of a prior issue is dispositive). 
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noted above, "[t]he cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to ascertain and give 
effect to the intention of the parties and, in determining that intention, the court 
looks to the language of the contract."  Watson, 407 S.C. at 454–55, 756 S.E.2d at 
161 (quoting Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 313 S.C. at 473, 438 S.E.2d at 277).  "Whe[n]
the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language 
alone determines the instrument's force and effect."  Id. at 455, 756 S.E.2d at 161
(quoting Jordan v. Sec. Grp., Inc., 311 S.C. 227, 230, 428 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1993)). 
We find no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether subsequent 
modifications of the Loan released Brust from the Guaranty's liability.  Under the 
Guaranty, Brust guaranteed payment of the indebtedness, and his liability was not 
"affected by . . . any one or more extensions or renewals of [i]ndebtedness or any 
modification of the . . . contractual terms."  Accordingly, a review of the Guaranty 
reveals no modification or renewal of the Loan released Brust from liability.  See
id. at 455, 756 S.E.2d at 161 (noting that clear and unambiguous language in a 
contract determines the contract's force and effect).8  Therefore, we affirm the 
circuit court as to this issue. 
II. Designation of Counterclaims as Defenses 
Additionally, Brust argues the circuit court erred in employing Rule 8(c), SCRCP, 
to classify his proposed counterclaims as defenses.  Brust reasons (1) the seventh 
and tenth defenses were not counterclaims, and (2) the court should have ruled 
upon his motion to amend to add counterclaims before classifying the two 
8 To the extent Brust argues First South was liable for violating its own banking 
policies by not obtaining a new guaranty for each modification of the Loan, we 
find Brust abandoned this argument at trial by specifically stating First South owed 
Brust no duty to comply with its own policies.  We further note our court has 
squarely rejected the argument that, in a normal creditor–debtor relationship, a 
bank owes a fiduciary duty to a debtor. See Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 354 S.C. 
648, 671, 582 S.E.2d 432, 444 (Ct. App. 2003) (providing that our courts have held 
"the normal relationship between a bank and its customer is one of creditor–debtor 
and not fiduciary in nature"). 
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counterclaims as defenses.9  Although we agree the court erred in classifying the 
counterclaims as defenses, we find no error in its application of Rule 8(c). 
A pleading which sets forth a . . . counterclaim . . . shall 
contain (1) a short and plain statement of the 
grounds . . . upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, 
unless the court already has jurisdiction to support it, (2) 
a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a prayer or demand
for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled. 
Rule 8(a), SCRCP. "A party shall state in short and plain terms the facts 
constituting his defenses to each cause of action asserted . . . ."  SCRCP 8(b), 
SCRCP. Rule 8(c), SCRCP, sets forth a nonexclusive list of affirmative defenses a 
party must plead, but it does not include negligence or breach of contract.  "An 
affirmative defense conditionally admits the allegations of the complaint, but 
asserts new matter to bar the action.  In other words, it assumes all elements of the 
plaintiff's case have been established."  O'Neal v. Carolina Farm Supply of 
Johnston, Inc., 279 S.C. 490, 494, 309 S.E.2d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 1983) (internal 
citation omitted).  "When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a 
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court shall treat the pleading as if 
there had been a proper designation."  Rule 8(c), SCRCP. 
At the outset, we find the circuit court incorrectly determined Brust's proposed 
counterclaims constituted defenses.  In our view, the court should have classified 
Brust's defenses as counterclaims.  The seventh defense and the first proposed 
counterclaim contained almost identical language, each setting forth a claim for 
negligence. Similarly, the tenth defense and second proposed counterclaim
contained almost identical language, each setting forth a breach of contract 
counterclaim. Moreover, the seventh and tenth defenses included demands for the 
court to bar First South's claims "in whole or in part" based upon facts pled in the 
answer. 
9 Although First South argues the defenses were correctly classified as 
counterclaims, the circuit court's ruling stated the proposed counterclaims "are and 
shall be treated as the defenses contained in the answer." 
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Given the similar language, as well as the fact that the circuit court already had 
jurisdiction over the matter, we find categorizing the defenses as counterclaims
pursuant to Rule 8(c) was the correct action.  See Rule 8(a) (requiring a 
counterclaim include a "statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief" and "a demand for judgment for the relief"); id. (requiring a counterclaim 
state the court's jurisdictional grounds unless the court already has jurisdiction); 
Rule 8(c) ("When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or 
a counterclaim as a defense, the court shall treat the pleading as if there had been a 
proper designation."). Accordingly, we affirm as modified the court's ruling 
because its application of Rule 8(c) was proper.  See Rule 220(c), SCACR (noting 
this court may affirm any ruling upon any ground appearing in the record).10 
III. Motion to Amend 
Finally, Brust contends the circuit court erred in denying his motion to amend the 
answer to include two counterclaims against First South.  According to Brust, the 
court mistakenly applied the doctrine of res judicata and, instead, should have 
analyzed his motion under Rule 15, SCRCP.  We find no reversible error. 
Given that Brust's proposed counterclaims raised the same assertions as his answer, 
we find any error in the circuit court's denial of his motion to amend harmless 
because the court disposed of these issues in its order granting summary judgment 
in favor of First South. See McCall v. Finley, 294 S.C. 1, 4, 362 S.E.2d 26, 28 (Ct. 
App. 1987) ("Appellate courts recognize . . . an overriding rule of civil procedure 
[that] says[] whatever doesn't make any difference, doesn't matter.").  In other 
words, even if the court had granted Brust's motion to amend, it would have had no 
practical effect on the outcome of the case.  We further note that, instead of 
arguing in favor of the motion to amend or requesting a continuance at the June 3, 
10 To the extent Brust argues the circuit court erred in not ruling upon his motion to
amend prior to ruling upon First South's motion for summary judgment, we find 
this issue is not preserved for appellate review.  At the summary judgment hearing, 
Brust failed to object to any issue regarding the procedure of the court's hearings 
on the motions. In fact, Brust conceded that the motion for summary judgment 
was the only issue before the court at the June 2014 hearing.  See Staubes v. City of 
Folly Beach, 339 S.C. 406, 412, 529 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000) ("[A]n issue cannot be 
raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by 
the [circuit] court to be preserved for appellate review."). 
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2014 hearing for the court to first rule upon his motion to amend, Brust agreed that 
the only issue before the court was the motion for summary judgment.  If Brust 
believed, as he now argues on appeal, that the additional counterclaims in his 
amended answer would have bearing on the court's summary judgment ruling, then 
we find it was incumbent upon him to object accordingly at that time.  Thus, under 
these facts, we are unable to conclude the circuit court abused its discretion in 
denying Brust's motion to amend his answer.  See City of N. Myrtle Beach v. 
Lewis-Davis, 360 S.C. 225, 232–33, 599 S.E.2d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 2004) (stating 
"a motion to amend is addressed to the sound discretion of the [circuit court]," and 
its "finding will not be overturned on appeal without an abuse of discretion" 
(quoting Duncan v. CRS Sirrine Eng'rs, Inc., 337 S.C. 537, 542, 524 S.E.2d 115, 
118 (Ct. App. 1999))). 
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the circuit court's judgment is 
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and MCDONALD, J., concur. 
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